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Empirical and Conceptual Perspectives on the Determinants of Subjective Well-Being 
 
Abstract 
What makes people happy? Philosophers have asked this question for over 2000 years, and more recently, 
it has sparked the interest of researchers in both economics and psychology. The present dissertation 
unites five studies on the determinants of subjective well-being. Study 1 investigates whether certain 
pursuits, such as spending more time with other people, are particularly suited to increase life satisfaction. 
Study 2 turns to an indicator of the absence of well-being, worries, and how they are affected by both age 
and external world events. Moving on to potential moderators, Study 3 tests the popular notion that 
overall life satisfaction is an aggregate of satisfaction with different life domains, weighted by the 
importance of the respective domains. Study 4 investigates whether age is an important moderator, as it 
seems plausible that different things matter to people in different life stages. Lastly, Study 5 provides a 
critique of a popular conceptualization of happiness in which its causes—genes, life circumstances, and 
volitional activities—are decomposed and compared quantitatively. Discussing problems underlying this 
reasoning naturally leads to challenges for future research on well-being which concludes this 
dissertation. 
Study 1: Rohrer, J. M., Richter, D., Brümmer, M., Wagner, G. G., Schmukle, S. C. (2018). Successfully 
striving for happiness: Socially engaged pursuits predict increases in life satisfaction, Psychological 
Science. doi:10.1177/0956797618761660   
Study 2: Rohrer, J. M., Brümmer, M., Schupp, J., & Wagner, G. G. (2018). Worries across time and age 
in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.012. 
Study 3: Rohrer, J. M., & Schmukle, S. C. (2018). Individual importance weighting of domain 
satisfaction ratings does not increase validity, Collabra: Psychology. doi:10.1525/collabra.116 
Study 4: Rohrer, J. M., & Mata, R. (unpublished manuscript). Age patterns in the correlates of subjective 
well-being across Europe. 
Study 5: Brown, N. J. L., & Rohrer, J. M. (2019). Easy as (happiness) pie? A critical evaluation of a 






Empirical and Conceptual Perspectives on the Determinants of Subjective Well-Being 
 
What makes people happy? Philosophers have asked this question for over 2000 years, as 
documented for example in fragments of the work of Democritus of Abdera in 420 B.C. (documented in 
Freeman & Diels, 1983). More recently, it has sparked the interest of researchers in both economics (see 
appendix of Weimann, Knabe, & Schöb, 2015, for a brief historical overview of this line of research) and 
psychology (see Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999, for an early retrospect of this line of research and 
Diener, Lucas, & Oishi, 2018, for an updated summary). Furthermore, happiness and its causes are 
deemed increasingly relevant for public policy (e.g., Diener, Lucas, Schimmack, & Helliwell, 2009).  
The present dissertation unites five studies on the determinants of subjective well-being. Study 1 
investigates whether certain pursuits, such as spending more time with other people, are particularly 
suited to increase life satisfaction. Study 2 turns to an indicator of the absence of well-being, worries, and 
how they are affected by both age and external world events. Moving on to potential moderators, Study 3 
tests the popular notion that overall life satisfaction is an aggregate of satisfaction with different life 
domains, weighted by the importance of the respective domains. Study 4 investigates whether age is an 
important moderator, as it seems plausible that different things matter to people in different life stages. 
Lastly, Study 5 provides a critique of a popular conceptualization of happiness in which its causes—
genes, life circumstances, and volitional activities—are decomposed and compared quantitatively. 
Discussing problems underlying this reasoning naturally leads to challenges for future research on well-
being which concludes this dissertation. 
Apart from the shared underlying research question, the five included studies approach the topic 
from different perspectives; asking mainly confirmatory (Study 1, Study 3), exploratory (Study 4) or 
conceptual (Study 5) research questions; making use of longitudinal (Study 1, Study 2) or cross-sectional 
(Study 3, Study 4) and cross-national data (Study 4).  
What is Subjective Well-Being? 
Whereas philosophers unsurprisingly have had a hard time agreeing on a definition of happiness 
(see White, 2008, for a history of the matter), psychologists seem to have converged to a definition in 
which “happiness” is considered synonymous with “subjective well-being.”1 Subjective well-being in turn 
                                               
1This is admittedly a simplification, as there are a number of researchers invested in the tradition of “eudaimonic 
well-being” (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2008) which is not subjective in nature but rather concerned about whether or not 





is (to some extent) well-defined as “an overall evaluation of the quality of a person’s life from her or his 
own perspective” (Diener, Lucas, & Oishi, 2018, pp. 1). This inclusive definition naturally results in a 
broad construct that can be disaggregated into various sub-constructs or components. In what one might 
call the canonical (i.e., “Dienerian”) model of happiness, there are four of them: (1) pleasant emotions 
(positive affect) and (2) the absence of unpleasant emotions (negative affect), (3) global life judgments 
and (4) more specific satisfaction judgments (i.e., satisfaction with domains such as health or work; 
Diener, Scollon, & Lucas, 2003). The former two are often subsumed under the term affective well-being, 
while the latter two are subsumed under the term cognitive well-being. Such a broad definition of 
subjective well-being is also applied in the present dissertation. 
What Determines Subjective Well-Being? 
A large number of studies have identified factors that might affect subjective well-being. For 
example, rather unsurprisingly and like all human traits (see Turkheimer, 2000) subjective well-being is 
to some extent heritable. Estimates indicate that 32-40 % of the overall variation might be accounted for 
by genetic influences, and this number rises to 70-80 % when considering stable differences in level of 
subjective well-being (i.e., differences in longer term averages; Nes & Røysamb, 2017).  Some of these 
genetic influences might be mediated through personality traits, which tend to be substantially 
intercorrelated with subjective well-being. For example, Steel, Schmidt and Shultz (2008) concluded that 
all of the Big Five personality traits (extraversion, emotional stability/neuroticism, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and openness to experience) are substantially correlated with many if not all 
components of subjective well-being (with associations ranging from r = .3 up to .7).  
However, when considering the plausibility of causal effects of personality traits on subjective 
well-being, one should keep in mind that there is substantial overlap within the constructs themselves. For 
example, neuroticism is highly correlated with negative affect, but neuroticism is partly defined as an 
individual’s proneness to experience negative emotions up to the point that the authors of the Big Five 
Inventory II decided to label this trait “Negative Emotionality” (Soto & John, 2017). Likewise, 
extraversion is highly correlated with positive affect, but “Positive Emotions” are deemed a facet of 
extraversion in a popular personality questionnaire (McCrae & Costa, 2010).  
                                               
self-acceptance and purpose in life). This tradition is often closer to philosophical debates about what normatively 
constitutes a good life and has been criticized for valuing the opinion of experts over the experience of the 
respondents themselves (Diener, Sapyta, & Suh, 1998), which might at least partly explain why there is overall less 






Not all associations between the Big Five and subjective well-being are entirely tautological—for 
example, the definition of conscientiousness does not directly refer to components of well-being. But for 
a multitude of supposed causes of well-being that are popular in the research field of positive psychology, 
such as optimism, self-esteem or even meaning in life, serious concerns about the causal order remain 
given that they might as well be considered indicators of subjective well-being. 
Moving to potential determinants that are unlikely to be associated by mere conceptual overlap, 
there is a very lively debate spanning dozens of studies that discuss whether and how age affects 
subjective well-being. Rather uncontroversial and intuitively plausible is the idea that in very high age, 
when approaching death, individuals’ well-being rapidly declines (Gerstorf, Ram, Mayraz, Hidajat, 
Lindenberger, Wagner, & Schupp, 2010). What happens before that remains controversial, whether 
subjective well-being remains mostly on a stable level throughout adulthood or dips in a midlife crisis, 
and how to even properly approach this question methodologically and statistically (see e.g. Blanchflower 
& Oswald, 2008, for two of the staunchest proponents of the dip in midlife, but also Frijters & Beatton, 
2012, and Kassenboehmer & Haisken-DeNew, 2012, for demonstrations that not everybody is convinced 
of the U-shape). 
Less controversially, there is considerable evidence that income is associated with subjective 
well-being (see Diener, Lucas, & Oishi, 2018, for an overview of studies); for example, in the World 
Value Survey, Lucas and Schimmack (2009) found an average within-country correlation of .21, which 
translates into a substantial gap between the poorest and the richest. It remains somewhat unclear 
whether, past a certain point, money ceases to matter (i.e., whether the marginal utility declines) or 
whether even among the wealthiest money can still buy happiness (see Diener, Lucas, & Oishi, 2018 for a 
summary). 
The first two studies of my dissertation, in line with this research tradition, aim to elucidate 
potential determinants of well-being. 
Study 1. Successfully Striving for Happiness: Socially Engaged Pursuits Predict Increases in Life 
Satisfaction 
It has been suggested that social pursuits (e.g., more time with one’s family) as opposed to 
individualistic pursuits (e.g., self-improvement) are particularly suited to improve well-being. This claim 
has been invoked to explain why the pursuit of happiness might backfire in individualistic cultures like 
the US (Ford et al., 2015), but it has not been directly put to test before. Hence, to fill this gap in the 





individuals’ ideas for how they could improve their well-being were able to predict life satisfaction one 
year later.  
Data came from the Innovation Sample of the Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP; Wagner, 
Frick, & Schupp, 2007) with a sample size ranging from 582 to 1,178 respondents depending on the 
particular analysis. Because of the confirmatory nature of the study, all central analyses had been 
preregistered. As predicted, we found that individuals who came up with socially engaged strategies were 
more satisfied with their lives after one year (difference of 0.21 SD units of life satisfaction), even when 
taking into account baseline differences in life satisfaction.  
In additional exploratory analyses, we probed the robustness of this finding to unobserved 
confounding and provided suggestive evidence for a plausible mediating path (socially engaged strategies 
→ increased socializing → life satisfaction). Furthermore, we found no differences between respondents 
who reported an idea that required them to actively pursue happiness as opposed to other statements (such 
as wishes for others to change their behavior, “different politics would improve my life”, or unspecific 
statements such as “there is not much I can change”), suggesting that it is not active intent per se that 
predicts a positive development of well-being.  
Thus, our study reinforces previous findings regarding the importance of an active social, and 
suggests that it may be a fruitful way for individuals to improve their well-being. 
Study 2. Worries Across Time and Age in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
In Rohrer, Brümmer, Schupp, and Wagner (2018), we considered the age trajectory of a rarely 
investigated manifestation of subjective well-being: individuals’ worries about worldly affairs such as the 
general economic situation, their own financial situation, and their personal health. We argue that such 
worries share features of both affective and cognitive well-being: While being worried (without further 
explication of the content of these worries) is an established component of affective well-being, worries 
about specific subjects are also cognitive in nature since they require respondents to consciously evaluate 
certain domains of their life or of their environment.  
Data came from the 2000 to 2016 survey waves of the SOEP (Wagner, Frick, & Schupp, 2007) 
with an overall sample size of around 350,000 observations across more than 60,000 unique respondents. 
Averaged across all worry domains, analyses indicated that with increasing age, respondents became 
more worried. However, this trend did not hold for all worry domains: while older individuals became 
increasingly concerned about their health and about the development of criminality in Germany, worries 





worries about the general economic situation peaked in middle adulthood around age 50. Hence, 
individuals’ worries also traced particular concerns, including political ones, that may vary in saliency 
across age groups. Furthermore, worries were also affected by historical events and exogeneous 
developments, such as the world financial crisis in 2008/2009 and the more recent wave of immigration to 
Germany.  
To explore whether age trajectories in different measures of well-being provide redundant 
information, we tested whether age trajectories in life satisfaction could partly be “explained away” by the 
observed age patterns in worries. However, the life satisfaction trajectory we found—a slight decrease 
until middle adulthood followed by a bump or at least a plateau around age 60-70, followed by a steep 
decline in very old age—was barely modified when controlling for worries. This demonstrates how 
different measures of well-being may provide non-redundant information about how people’s lives are 
going and reinforces the notion that multiple measures are necessary to capture the full picture. 
Moderators of the Determinants of Subjective Well-Being 
As outlined in the previous section, a wealth of studies (including Study 1 and Study 2 of this 
dissertation) has tried to explore general regularities in subjective well-being. For example, does a higher 
income increase well-being on average? However, it seems entirely plausible that there are 
interindividual differences in the extent to which individuals’ well-being is affected by certain factors. 
Income might be a powerful determinant of well-being for somebody who is status-conscious and cares a 
lot about accumulating wealth—but maybe less so for a hippie dedicated to non-material values.  
The values-as-moderator model suggests that life domains particularly valued by an individual 
will exert larger effects on their well-being (Oishi, Diener, Suh, & Lucas, 1999). Despite of the intuitive 
appeal of such a model, empirical demonstrations have been sparse; probably because the research 
question concerns interaction effects which, under reasonable assumptions, require much larger sample 
sizes to be detected reliably (e.g., Gelman, 2018).  
Study 3. Individual Importance Weighting of Domain Satisfaction Ratings does not Increase 
validity 
In Rohrer and Schmukle (2018) we considered whether and to which extent the importance 
individuals assign to different life domains affects the impact of these life domains on global judgments 
of well-being. It has been suggested that when integrating individuals’ domain satisfaction ratings (i.e., 
satisfaction with one’s health, one’s family life, one’s job), weighting the different domains according to 





To put this hypothesis to test, we used the responses of 5,049 individuals from the well-being 
supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID; Freedman, 2017). Results suggested that 
using the importance weights when aggregating the domain satisfaction reports did not improve 
correlations with the criterion variable, a well-validated global measure of life satisfaction, beyond the 
mere effects of normative difference in weights: For example, respondents reported that their family lives 
were more important than their housing satisfaction, and indeed, an optimally weighted domain 
satisfaction composite assigned higher weight to family satisfaction than to housing satisfaction across 
respondents. However, using individual importance information—i.e., assigning a higher weight to family 
satisfaction only for respondents who reported a higher importance of family life—did not improve 
validity.2  
We implemented a large number of robustness checks and furthermore demonstrated converging 
conclusions for two approaches, weighted composite scores and moderated regression analyses. This lack 
of empirical foundation for importance-weighting approaches, despite their intuitive appeal, raises a 
number of questions: Can respondents access the relevant information about what matters to them in a 
reliable manner? Are global self-evaluations unsuitable criteria as they may partly also capture irrelevant 
variance? Of course, our findings might also suggest that the overall premise is mistaken and that the 
effects of various life domain on overall well-being are actually mostly homogeneous across individuals. 
However, such a conclusion would be premature, as the findings from the following study suggest. 
Study 4. Age Patterns in the Correlates of Subjective Well-Being Across Europe 
Turning to another potential moderator, Rohrer and Mata (under review) considered whether 
respondents’ age modifies the correlations between subjective well-being and three central aspects of 
life—social relations, income, and self-assessed health.  
Data came from eight cross-sectional waves of the European Social Survey which includes 
respondents from 32 different nations (N = 255,065). Results overall suggested that the correlation 
between social relations and well-being is higher among older respondents with a mild age-increase 
between 20 and 80 (r ≈ .15 to r ≈ .25). In contrast, the correlation between income and well-being showed 
a hump-shaped trajectory, with income being less relevant in young (r ≈ .15 at age 20) and old age (r ≈ 
.15 at age 80) compared to middle age (r ≈ .25-.30). Health—operationalized either as a global self-
                                               
2Results mirror findings from research on self-esteem, where a very similar model has been proposed in which one’s 






assessment or as the number of symptoms affecting respondents—again showed correlations with well-
being that increased with age (r ≈ .30 to r ≈ .38 for the global assessment and r ≈ .10 to r ≈ .20 for the 
symptom checklist).  
To get a better understanding of which contextual factors might shape these age-graded 
correlations, we explored how they varied between nations. While we observed considerable variability in 
the trajectories of the correlations between countries, three country-level factors that we considered 
(wealth, fertility, and equality) had only little explanatory power. Hence, while we were able to document 
some interesting patterns in our cross-sectional analysis, we failed to figure out factors that strongly 
impact their shape. Furthermore, we stress that the cross-sectional nature of our data allows for alternative 
explanations such as cohort-differences in the determinants of well-being (which would be interesting in 
their own right), and discuss some avenues for future research. 
What Matters Most? 
Given the immense popularity of inquiries into the determinants of well-being, the question arises 
whether we can integrate everything we know to finally get an understanding of what matters for 
happiness, and how much these factors contribute. Deriving such insights seems appealing: the 
information could be used to guide policies aimed at maximizing individuals’ well-being, and it would be 
highly valuable for lay-people interested in their potential to improve their well-being, the usual target 
audience when findings from positive psychology are communicated to the broader public. 
In a popular attempt to offer such an integration, Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade (2005) 
suggested that the variance in chronic (i.e., at least middle-term average) happiness can be decomposed 
into 50% genetic influences and 10% life circumstances, leaving up to 40% for the effects of volitional 
activities—which supposedly highlights how individuals play an important role in shaping their own 
happiness by choosing the right activities. This up-beat take has become what may be one of the most 
widely spread claims of positive psychology and has received more than 3,000 citations on Google 
Scholar at the time of writing.  
Study 5. Easy as (Happiness) Pie? A Critical Evaluation of a Popular Model of the Determinants of 
Well-Being 
However, popularity, of course, does not imply scientific accuracy. In Brown and Rohrer (under 
review), we sought to systematically address the individual elements of the influential argument by 
Lyubomirsky at al. (2005). The purpose of this inquiry was to highlight central misconceptions that have 





For example, in our critique, we explain that between-subjects variance decomposition has little 
implications for individual-level potential for change: First, within-subject variance decomposition will 
likely lead to different estimates than between-subjects variance composition. Second, even if the former 
was not an issue, the potential for change cannot be gauged this way, since variance decomposition is 
bound to the existing variability in the population. It cannot possibly tell us whether, for example, there 
are some highly effective interventions that increase well-being that simply have not been discovered yet.  
Furthermore, we highlight that the decomposition into genes, life circumstances, and volitional 
activity rests on a naïve model of how genes and humans operate. The effect of genes will be partially 
mediated by behaviors that very much appear like volitional activities (e.g., a genetic predisposition for 
higher levels of physical activity) or life circumstances (e.g., high cognitive abilities that might result in 
higher levels of educations). More specific issues with the model suggested by Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) 
include serious doubts about the specific estimates included in the model and an implied extrapolation to 
humans in general whereas data came from middle- and upper-class US-Americans in the 1970s. 
While our extended treatment of the so-called happiness pie model is very critical, it serves to 
communicate a central message: Things are much more complicated than they may seem to uncritical 
consumers of the published literature. During the review process of the manuscript, multiple reviewers 
requested an updated variance decomposition and a new estimate for the effect of volitional activities on 
happiness, even though we stressed throughout the manuscript that such an estimate was conceptually ill-
specified. In this sense, the experience of producing the manuscript highlighted how much of the field is 
still dominated by a desire for simple, generalizable explanations of the highly complex and culturally 
embedded phenomenon of subjective well-being. 
Such simple explanations may or may not exist, but in any case, progress in the research of the 
determinants of well-being crucially relies on more conceptually and methodologically refined studies 
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Successfully Striving for Happiness: Socially Engaged Pursuits Predict Increases in Life Satisfaction 
 
Julia M. Rohrer, David Richter, Martin Brümmer, Gert G. Wagner, & Stefan C. Schmukle 
 
Abstract 
Happiness is considered a highly desirable attribute, but whether or not individuals can actively steer their 
lives toward greater well-being is an open empirical question. In this study, respondents from a 
representative German sample reported ideas for how they could improve their life satisfaction in text 
format. We investigated which of these ideas predicted changes in life satisfaction 1 year later.  Active 
pursuits per se—as opposed to statements about external circumstances or fortune—were not associated 
with changes in life satisfaction (N = 1,178). However, in line with our preregistered hypothesis, among 
individuals who described active pursuits (N = 582), those who described social ideas (e.g., spending 
more time with friends and family) ended up being more satisfied, and this effect was partly mediated by 
increased socializing. Our results demonstrate that not all pursuits of happiness are equally successful and 
corroborate the great importance of social relationships for human well-being. 
The final version of this article which underwent further copyediting & typesetting has been published in 
Psychological Science. 
Additional online material, the preregistration plan, analysis scripts, and the data sets necessary to 







Successfully Striving for Happiness: Only Socially Engaged Pursuits Predict Increases in Life 
Satisfaction 
 
Success, material wealth, intelligence—people value a range of desirable attributes, but across a 
wide range of nations, nothing ranks quite as high in importance as happiness (Diener, 2000; Diener & 
Oishi, 2006, as cited in Oishi, Diener, & Lucas, 2007), which is considered an ultimate goal by both 
philosophers and lay people (Kesebir & Diener, 2008). Can we as individuals attain happiness by actively 
steering our lives toward greater well-being? The very idea of the pursuit of happiness suggests so. 
However, whether this intuition holds true is an empirical question, and studies have suggested that the 
opposite may be the case: Actively pursuing happiness might actually decrease it (Ford & Mauss, 2014; 
Mauss et al., 2012; Mauss, Tamir, Anderson, & Savino, 2011; Schooler, Ariely, & Loewenstein, 2003).  
One possible explanation for these paradoxical findings is that people pursue happiness in the 
wrong ways. For example, Schooler et al. (2003) suggested that individuals overselect material goals that 
are unlikely to lead to long-lasting well-being. In a similar vein, Mauss et al. (2012) argued that 
individuals in Western countries define happiness in terms of personal gains. Accordingly, people’s 
endeavors consist of self-centered activities and lead to the neglect of social relationships. But social 
relationships are centrally important for well-being (Diener & Oishi, 2005; Helliwell & Putnam, 2004), 
and thus, the pursuit of happiness backfires because people end up lonelier. 
By contrast, pursuing happiness in socially engaged ways might foster well-being. This notion 
was corroborated by a cross-cultural study by Ford et al. (2015) who found that culture shapes definitions 
of happiness, and these definitions can in turn explain whether striving for happiness is associated with 
higher or lower well-being. In East Asia and Russia, where people were found to define happiness 
socially, the motivation to pursue happiness was positively associated with well-being. However, in the 
US, where people were less likely to define happiness socially, a higher motivation to pursue happiness 
was associated with lower well-being. Finally, Germany as an “intermediate” case showed no association 
between the pursuit of happiness and well-being. 
Evidence for the benefits of social as compared with nonsocial pursuits in the study by Ford et al. 
(2015), however, is rather indirect. The study assessed only definitions of happiness and not the ways in 
which people actually pursue it. Furthermore, data were cross-sectional, and thus, the authors were not 
able to rule out alternative explanations. A more direct test is needed to establish the positive effects of 





In this study, we investigated whether individuals who describe socially engaged strategies for 
improving their life satisfaction experience more positive changes than individuals who describe 
nonsocial strategies. Data came from a representative German multicohort study. In 2014, respondents 
reported their current level of life satisfaction and reported in text format what they could do to improve 
it. One year later, life satisfaction was assessed again, allowing us to test whether mentions of active 
pursuits of happiness per se were associated with life satisfaction, and whether strategies involving social 
engagement—but not nonsocial strategies—increased well-being. In addition, we assessed the extent to 
which our results were robust to the potential threat of unobserved confounding, and tested whether the 
effects of social strategies were mediated by the frequency with which respondents actually socialized. 
Furthermore, we ran additional exploratory analyses investigating different types of pursuits, as well as 
alternative measures of well-being. 
Method 
Sample 
Data came from the Innovation Sample (SOEP IS; Richter & Schupp, 2015) of the German 
Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP; Wagner et al., 2007). The SOEP is a research infrastructure situated 
at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) under the umbrella of the Leibniz 
Association. The SOEP’s core study has been following German households and their members since 
1984. The innovation sample (SOEP IS) was started in 2011 and has since then offered researchers 
worldwide the opportunity to include questions and even experimental manipulations in the annual 
collecting of data. 
In 2014, a total of 6,638 respondents took part in the SOEP IS; in 2015, 5,897 respondents took 
part in the survey; 1,120 of the respondents in 2014 were not surveyed in 2015, leaving a total of 5,518 
respondents who participated in both years. All respondents were surveyed in computer-assisted personal 
interviews (CAPIs). Not all SOEP IS respondents were asked all questions by design, and not all 
respondents who were asked the questions relevant to this study provided an answer; see details below 
and additional material on the OSF (https://osf.io/cemyh/). 
Assessment of Life Satisfaction 
In 2014 and 2015, respondents answered the question “All things considered, how satisfied are 
you with your life?” on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely 
satisfied). Previous studies have reported satisfactory reliabilities for such single-item assessments of life 





2015, four did not answer the life satisfaction item in at least 1 of the 2 years and were thus excluded from 
further analysis, leaving N = 5,514.  
Assessment of Strategies to Maintain or Improve Life Satisfaction 
Whether or not respondents were asked for their strategies regarding life satisfaction depended on 
(a) whether their household was randomly assigned to the more detailed well-being module and (b) their 
answer to a specific filter question. Of N = 5,514, only 1,547 were assigned to the more detailed well-
being module. Following the assessment of life satisfaction in 2014, respondents were furthermore asked 
to report how satisfied they would be in the future: “All things considered, how satisfied will you be in 
the future, let’s say in 5 years?” Respondents could again reply on an 11-point Likert scale, this time 
ranging from -5 (far less satisfied than now) to 0 (approximately as satisfied as now) to +5 (far more 
satisfied than now). Most of the N = 1,547 respondents predicted that they would be as satisfied as they 
were at the time of the survey (46.28%) or even more satisfied (42.86%) as opposed to less satisfied 
(10.86%). Notice that this item was not included in any of our analyses; however, only the respondents 
who estimated they would be at least as satisfied in the future as they are now (N = 1,379, 89.14%) were 
asked the question regarding their strategies for how they would improve life satisfaction.3 
At the very end of the interview session, these respondents were asked to input their strategies for 
life satisfaction into the computer. The interviewer turned the computer toward the respondent; on the 
screen, the following words were displayed: “What could you do to ensure that you will be more satisfied 
in the future or continue to be as satisfied as you already are? What are your ideas?” with the additional 
instructions “Please take some time to reply and express your ideas in a few words.” A total of 1,178 
respondents answered this open-ended question. 
This final sample of 1,178 respondents did not differ from the original sample of 5,518 SOEP-IS 
respondents with respect to gender, age, years of education, employment status, and marital status (all ps 
> .133). 
Rating the answers to the open-ended question: Focal hypothesis. The answers that the 
respondents typed in were then rated by three independent coders. The participants’ answers were quite 
heterogeneous. For example, despite the phrasing of the question, many respondents instead described 
what they wished for (“the politicians would need to change”) without any reference to what they could 
                                               
3The open-ended question was added to the SOEP-IS in collaboration with Albrecht Plewnia and Astrid Rothe from 






actively do. Thus, a complex rating scheme was developed to capture the heterogeneity of the texts. A 
more extensive documentation of the coding procedures, including the coding manual (in both English 
and German) and a tool programmed for the purpose of this study, are available on the OSF. 
Coding was split into two sessions. In the first session, the raters coded (Step 1) how many ideas 
for the improvement (or maintenance) of life satisfaction a particular answer included. If the text 
contained no ideas, a variety of “other statement” categories could be coded (e.g., “don’t know”; “I’m 
satisfied as I am”). If there were any ideas, coders subsequently rated each idea on whether it was a 
strategy, defined as an idea that required the respondent to take action (e.g., “Find a better job to make 
more money”; Step 2). Notice that each single idea within each answer was rated to preserve as much 
information as possible. Additional coding steps that are not relevant in the context of the present study 
but are described in the coding manual followed. 
In the second session, all texts that contained at least one strategy according to at least two of the 
three raters were sent out again to the same raters. Raters now made only the binary decision of whether 
the texts solely consisted of nonsocial strategies (e.g., “stay healthy,” “find a better job”) or whether they 
contained at least one explicitly socially engaged strategy (e.g., “spend more time with friends and 
family” or “join a nonprofit”). 
For the purpose of the study, we simplified all relevant ratings into binary indicators according to 
the raters’ majority vote: Does the text contain any ideas about how to improve life satisfaction (see 
Coding Step 1, first session; interrater agreement Fleiss’ κ = .94; true for N = 808 texts); does the text 
contain any strategies, that is, any active ideas (see Coding Step 2, first session; Fleiss’ κ = .79; true for N 
= 582 texts); and does the text contain any socially engaged strategies (see second session; Fleiss’ κ = .91; 
true for N = 184 texts).   
Analyses 
The initial analysis compared individuals who reported strategies for how they could actively 
maintain or improve their well-being (N = 582) with individuals who answered the question differently—
either by making a general statement such as “everything is fine” or “there is not much I could change” or 
describing a specific idea or wishes that did not necessarily imply an action taken by the respective 
individual such as “different politics would improve life” (N = 596, of which 370 made a general 
statement and 226 gave only nonactive ideas). Overall, the analysis included N = 1,178 respondents 





The focal preregistered analysis stated that we would compare individuals with socially engaged 
strategies such as “helping others” (N = 184) with individuals with other, nonsocial strategies such as 
“stop smoking” (N = 398). Overall, this analysis included N = 582 respondents (53.78% female) who 
were slightly younger on average (M = 46.87 years, SD = 14.53) compared with the first analysis. This 
analysis was registered after the SOEP IS data (2014 and 2015) had been collected but before the texts 
had been rated and before we looked at the life satisfaction data. Thus, the variables necessary to run the 
focal analysis did not exist when the analyses and hypotheses were preregistered. Refer to the 
preregistration form and an additional timeline of the project on the OSF for details about the 
preregistration. 
Results 
Preceding Analysis: Strategies versus Nonactive Ideas for the Improvement of Life Satisfaction 
First, we compared respondents who actually reported at least one active strategy with 
respondents who answered the open-ended question without describing an action they could take (i.e., 
only nonactive ideas). In 2014, these two groups barely differed in life satisfaction. Individuals who did 
not report a strategy had slightly higher levels of life satisfaction (Mno strategy, 2014 = 7.49) than individuals 
who reported a strategy (Mstrategy, 2014 = 7.38), but this difference was negligible; d = 0.07, 95% confidence 
interval [-0.04, 0.19], t(1175.9) = 1.23, p = .212 (see Figure 1, Panel A; all ds reported as mean 
differences in pooled standard deviation units). From 2014 to 2015, the group reporting no strategy 
showed a slight increase in mean satisfaction of 0.10 scale points; d = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.18], t(595) = 
1.86, p = .063. The group reporting a strategy showed a negligible increase of 0.05 scale points; d = 0.03, 
95%  CI [-0.09, 0.15], t(581) = 0.77, p = .441. We ran a linear model in which we predicted life 
satisfaction in 2015 from life satisfaction in 2014 and a binary indicator reflecting whether the respondent 
reported a strategy or not (0 = no strategy reported, 1 = at least one strategy reported). This analysis 
indicated no significant effect of whether or not the respondent reported a strategy: b = - 0.10 (-0.06 SD 
units of life satisfaction, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.03]), p = .177 (see Supplementary Table 1 for the complete 
regression output). Thus, respondents who answered the question without describing an active strategy for 
how they would improve their life satisfaction were virtually indistinguishable from respondents who 
described such a strategy with respects to their life satisfaction in both 2014 and 2015.  
Focal Preregistered Analysis: Socially Engaged Strategies versus Nonsocial Strategies 
In our central analysis, we compared two subgroups of the respondents who described an active 
strategy in their answer: Individuals who described at least one socially engaged strategy and individuals 





reported slightly higher levels of life satisfaction (Msocial, 2014 = 7.57) than individuals who described only 
nonsocial strategies (Mnonsocial, 2014 = 7.29); d = 0.18, 95% CI [0.01, 0.36], t(342.86) = -2.03, p = .043 (see 
Figure 1, Panel A). From 2014 to 2015, the group reporting a social strategy showed a slight increase in 
mean satisfaction of 0.19 scale points; d = 0.13, 95% CI [0.08, 0.33], t(183) = 1.99, p = .047. By contrast, 
the mean life satisfaction in the group reporting nonsocial strategies remained virtually unchanged with a 
change of -0.02 scale points; d = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.13],  t(397) = -0.26, p = .792. We ran a linear 
regression model predicting life satisfaction in 2015 from life satisfaction in 2014 and a binary indicator 
reflecting social strategies (0 = only nonsocial strategies, 1 = at least one social strategy). The results 
indicated that, controlling for baseline differences in life satisfaction, socially engaged strategies had a 
positive effect on life satisfaction in 2015: b = 0.33, SE = 0.12, p = .005 (see Supplementary Table 2 for 




                                               
4The regression model tests whether, controlling for life satisfaction in 2014, respondents with socially engaged 
strategies were more or less satisfied in 2015: If there were no preexisting differences in life satisfaction in 2014, 
how would the two groups have compared in 2015? In addition to this model, which had been registered as the 
central test of our hypothesis, we also compared difference scores (life satisfaction 2015 – life satisfaction 2014) 
between the two groups (Mdiff social  = 0.19 vs. Mdiff nonsocial = -0.02), which tests a slightly different hypothesis: 
Ignoring initial differences, which of the two groups “gains” more life satisfaction? The comparison missed the 
significance threshold of p < .05 (two-sided), d = 0.15, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.32], t(412.32) = 1.72, p = .085. See also 





Figure 1. Mean scores and 95% confidence intervals of life satisfaction in 2014 and 2015 for different groups. Panel 
A: Individuals with at least one strategy (N = 582) versus individuals without a strategy (N = 596) for how to 
improve their life satisfaction. Panel B: Individuals with at least one socially engaged strategy (N = 184) versus 
individuals with only nonsocial strategies (N = 398). The horizontal grey line marks the grand mean of life 
satisfaction in 2014 and 2015 for all respondents who answered the open-ended question. 
Additional Analyses 
Robustness to unobserved confounding. Given that the reported relationship between socially 
engaged strategies and increased life satisfaction was based on observational data, it is important for a 
causal interpretation to consider the extent to which these findings could be attributed to unobserved 
confounding. Crucially, we controlled for life satisfaction in 2014 in our analyses, and this potentially 
rules out a large number of alternative explanations such as confounding by stable dispositions (e.g., 
extraversion). A potential confounder that could still explain the pattern of results would need to (a) 
causally affect strategies in 2014, (b) causally affect life satisfaction in 2015, but would also need to (c) 
not affect life satisfaction in 2014 to the same extent so that the confounder would still influence life 
satisfaction in 2015 when life satisfaction in 2014 was controlled for. It is possible to come up with such 
scenarios, although the plausibility of such scenarios might be debatable. For example, a respondent in 
2014 might have anticipated a marriage proposal over the course of the next year and thus reported a 
socially engaged strategy such as “more time with partner.” One year later, he/she might have then 
reported elevated levels of life satisfaction because of the recent engagement.  
If we assume the existence of such observed confounders, it would be interesting to assess how 
they would affect our results and how influential they would need to be to negate our findings. Oster 
(2016) developed a method that allows researchers to assess the extent to which an effect is robust to 
unobserved confounding on the basis of changes in coefficients and changes in explained variance when 
controlling for observed confounding. The procedure can be used to answer the question of the extent to 
which unobserved confounders would need to affect selection into the group of treated respondents (i.e., 
respondents reporting socially engaged strategies) in order to negate the observed effect.5 This analysis 
indicated that the selection based on unobserved confounders would need to be 1.47 times as important as 
the selection based on the observed confounder (life satisfaction in 2014) to render the effect of socially 
                                               
5The method requires an assumption regarding how much of the variance in the outcome variable can potentially be 
explained. We assumed 74%, which equals the highest reliability estimate from Lucas and Donnellan (2012), and 
which gives an upper bound of the valid variance. Notice that if we had assumed lower values, conclusions 





engaged strategies on life satisfaction in 2015 zero, which can be considered a robust effect according to 
the standard suggested by Oster (2016). Thus, we conclude that unobserved confounders would need to 
be of extraordinary importance to negate our finding, and this conclusion further corroborates our 
confidence in a causal interpretation of our finding. The output of the analysis can be found on the OSF. 
A Potential Pathway from Socially Engaged Strategies to Life Satisfaction. The central 
preregistered analysis demonstrated a link between respondents’ reports of what they could do and 
subsequent life satisfaction. However, this link does not necessarily imply that respondents who reported 
socially engaged strategies actually implemented these strategies and thus were more satisfied 1 year 
later. Therefore, we additionally ran a mediation analysis to test whether the relationship between 
strategies and life satisfaction could in part be explained by socializing with friends, relatives, or 
neighbors. 
In 2015, respondents reported how frequently they participated in a range of activities in their free 
time, such as visiting cultural events or actively doing sports. Relevant to the purpose of the present 
study, they also reported how frequently they participated in “socializing with friends, relatives, or 
neighbors” on a 4-point scale (4 = every week, 3 = every month, 2 = more rarely, 1 = never). Among the 
respondents who had reported an active idea, respondents who reported a socially engaged strategy in 
2014 reported more frequent socializing; Mdnsocial = 4, Mdnnonsocial = 3, z = -3.46, p < .001, or, when we 
treated socializing as a continuous variable, Msocial = 3.42, Mnonsocial = 3.19; d = 0.32, 95% CI [0.15, 0.50] 
t(410.98) = -3.81, p < .001. 
To test whether more frequent socializing could (partly) explain the relationship between socially 
engaged strategies and life satisfaction, we ran a mediation analysis in MPlus 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 
1998-2010). In our model, we predicted life satisfaction in 2015 from life satisfaction in 2014, whether or 
not respondents had reported a socially engaged strategy in 2014, and socializing in 2015 (treated as an 
ordinal variable). Furthermore, we predicted socializing in 2015 from the strategies reported in 2014; and 
we allowed life satisfaction in 2014 to correlate with socializing in 2015 and strategies reported in 2014. 
Bootstrapped confidence intervals indicated a statistically significant indirect effect from socially engaged 
strategies to life satisfaction in 2015 mediated via socializing, with an indirect effect of b = 0.049 and a 
bias-corrected 95% confidence interval of [0.005, 0.117], standardized b = 0.015, 95% CI [0.001, 0.033], 
see Figure 2. The direct effect retained its statistical significance, b = 0.279, with a bias corrected 95% 
confidence interval of [0.058, 0.512], standardized b = 0.082, 95% CI [0.017. 0.149]. Treating socializing 








Figure 2. Coefficients and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals from the mediation model, N = 582. Socializing 
was entered as a categorical variable, but conclusion remained unaffected when entering it as a continuous variable. 
Alternative independent and dependent variables. In addition to the central preregistered 
analysis, we ran exploratory analyses including additional independent variables (i.e., alternative 
categories of strategies) and additional dependent variables (i.e., alternative measures of well-being). 
Details and results can be found in the supplemental online material. 
Discussion 
Our analyses showed that active ideas for the pursuit of life satisfaction were not beneficial per 
se. Half of the respondents answered the question “What can you do so that you will be more satisfied in 
the future?” without describing an action they could perform themselves. Instead, they referred to external 
circumstances or fortune. A possible explanation for this high number of nonactive responses could be 
that the German concept of happiness (“Glück”) also encompasses opportunity and fortune (Oishi et al., 
2013). Importantly, these respondents were on average not less satisfied than those with active strategies. 
This finding is conceptually aligned with the results of Ford et al. (2015), who found no correlation 
between the motivation to pursue happiness and well-being in their German sample.  
However, among respondents who did report an active idea, those who described socially 
engaged pursuits became more satisfied over the course of 1 year. There are multiple potential 
explanations for the positive effects of socially engaged strategies versus nonsocial strategies. For 
example, changes in the social domain might be more feasible. Respondents who reported aiming for a 





setbacks that diminished their life satisfaction, whereas respondents who reported spending more time 
with friends/family might have successfully implemented these strategies. Indeed, our data indicated that 
respondents with social strategies spent more time socializing after 1 year, and this could in part explain 
the benefit of socially engaged strategies. In addition, it is possible that respondents with nonsocial 
pursuits successfully achieved their goals yet suffered from adverse side effects (e.g., less time with 
others, resulting in increased loneliness and thus decreased life satisfaction; cf. Mauss et al., 2012), or the 
results of individualistic strategies might have been less rewarding than anticipated (cf. Schooler et al., 
2003).  
Whereas the present longitudinal study constitutes a considerable expansion of previous cross-
sectional findings, follow-up studies making use of experimental manipulations or a more sophisticated 
longitudinal design with multiple assessments of both life satisfaction and pursuits are needed to 
corroborate our findings. Simultaneously, the ecological validity of our approach was high: Respondents 
came from a nationally representative panel with heterogeneous demographics. They reported their own 
strategies in text format, which allowed us to capture the full range of approaches to well-being instead of 
superimposing preselected items. Rozin (2001) suggested that research be broadened by using strong 
descriptions of real-life phenomena, and we believe our study contributes to this endeavor.  
Beyond new insights into how people can potentially increase their happiness, our research 
underscores the crucial role that other people play in our lives. Social relationships and affiliations have 
powerful effects on health (e.g., Berkman, Glass, Brissette, & Seeman, 2000); loneliness and social 
isolation have even been associated with increased mortality (Holt-Lunstad, Smith, Baker, Harris, & 
Stephenson, 2015). Our analyses further strengthen the notion that investments in social relationships are 
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Worries Across Time and Age in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
 
Julia M. Rohrer, Martin Brümmer, Jürgen Schupp, & Gert G. Wagner 
 
Abstract 
We investigate how indicators of dissatisfaction—worries about a variety of life domains such as health, 
the state of the economy, and immigration—change across time and age in Germany based on Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) data. As expected, contemporary world events influenced respondents’ worries. 
For example, worries about peace peaked in 2003, the year of the Iraq War; worries about both 
immigration to Germany and hostility against foreigners have risen in the wake of the refugee crisis. We 
find that, independent of these historical effects, most types of worries increased with age, although this 
trend slows down in old age. With increasing age, respondents also became more likely to answer an 
open-ended question asking for “any other worries,” which suggests that the age trends in worries cannot 
merely be attributed to a potential measurement problem due to the specific choice of worry items 
included in the survey. 
The final version of this article which underwent further copyediting & typesetting has been published in 







Worries Across Time and Age in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
 
A vast number of studies analyse the well-being of people by means of data on happiness and 
satisfaction with life in general and/or satisfaction in different domains of life. In these papers, income 
and other resources, as well as events (like birth of a child or becoming unemployed), are correlated with 
happiness and satisfaction. However, happiness and satisfaction likely do not capture everything that 
matters to an individual and there are subjective states—such as expectations and worries—that might 
show unique links to resources and events. In this paper, we are interested in a specific subjective state 
that matters for subjective well-being: We analyze people’s worries about various domains (e.g., about 
their health, about the economy, and about the environment) across time and age based on longitudinal 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).  
First, we briefly introduce the predominant framework for subjective well-being, its various 
facets, and how worries can be located within this framework. In the second part, we describe our 
database, the German SOEP. In the third part, we describe how worries about different life domains 
changed between 2000 and 2016, while in the fourth part, we employ panel regression models to 
investigate how worries vary with age, considering (i) single closed-ended worry items; (ii) a composite 
measure reflecting the overall level of worries; and (iii) the odds of reporting additional worries in a text 
answer. In the fifth part, we turn to the “positive” side of wellbeing, exploring whether age-associated 
changes in worries can, in part, account for changes in life satisfaction over the life course. Finally, we 
discuss potential implications of life course trends in worries. 
A framework of subjective well-being 
Subjective well-being (SWB)—how people perceive the quality of their lives—has sparked the 
interest of psychologists and economists for several decades (see e.g., Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999, 
for an early retrospect of psychological research; see e.g. Weimann, Knabe, & Schöb, 2015, p. 155, for a 
brief historical overview of economic research). Although different research traditions emphasize 
different conceptions of SWB, a certain degree of consensus regarding the different facets of the construct 
has been reached. 
Broadly speaking, SWB is conceptualized as consisting of two broad components: Affective well-
being, which captures the emotional experiences of respondents, and cognitive well-being, which captures 
how respondents consciously evaluate their life. These two broad components can be further separated 
into distinct subcomponents. For example, affective well-being is frequently operationalized as a two-





(sadness, worries, etc.), and there is a vivid debate regarding whether these two dimensions are 
independent or not (see Diener, Scollon, & Lucas, 2009, for a brief summary of this debate). Cognitive 
subjective well-being is most frequently assessed as global judgments of one’s life (e.g. global life 
satisfaction, meaningfulness), but it is also possible to ask for subjective assessments of specific life 
domains, such as marriage or leisure time. 
How can people’s worries be fitted into this framework? On the one hand, worry refers to an 
unpleasant emotional state; in this sense, one could locate worries as a part of the negative affect and, 
indeed, “worried” is frequently included as an attribute in scales measuring negative affect. However, 
worries may also reflect the conscious evaluation of specific life circumstances. For example, when asked 
about worries regarding their health, respondents might evaluate their own state of health—in this sense, 
one could think of worries as a cognitive evaluation of a specific life domain. Thus, measures of specific 
worries might defy the simple classification of affective versus cognitive measures. In line with this idea, 
clinical models of Generalized Anxiety Order, which is characterized by pathological levels of worries, 
acknowledge that symptoms and causes of worries are both cognitive and affective in nature (e.g., 
Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004).6 As worries have this special status, it might be of particular interest 
to disentangle worries from other facets of subjective well-being. 
Data: The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) 
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal 
study of private households in Germany, using a multi cohort approach, that started in 1984 (Wagner et 
al. 2007, Headey et al. 2010).  About 15,000 households, covering about 30,000 individuals are surveyed 
every year by the fieldwork organization Kantar Public, Munich (formerly named TNS Infratest 
Sozialforschung), which has been responsible for the fieldwork of the SOEP since 1984. The data provide 
information on all household members, including not only German citizens in East and West Germany, 
but also foreigners and recent immigrants. The topics included in the survey include, among others, 
household composition, occupational biographies, employment, earnings, health, political attitudes, 
subjective indicators on well-being (Schupp 2015), such as life satisfaction in general and in different 
domains, as well as, of interest for the present study, worries about different life domains.   
                                               
6 The fact that worries might cross the boundaries between cognitive and affective measures is probably no surprise 
given that the suggested facets of SWB rather constitute a useful heuristic for the assessment of a very broad concept 
than a theoretically motivated ontology of separable dimensions of psychological states. In fact, all facets of SWB 





For the purpose of this study, we limited analysis to the 2000 to 2016 survey years.7 We selected 
seven worry items that were included each of these years and were relevant to all respondents, i.e. we 
excluded the item regarding the security of employment as it only applied to the subsample of employed 
respondents.  
Respondents were queried about their worries concerning (1) the general economic situation; (2) 
their personal health; (3) the protection of the environment; (4) peace; (5) the development of criminality 
in Germany; (6) immigration to Germany; and (7) hostility toward foreigners in Germany. Respondents 
answered on a three-point scale (1 = “very worried,” 2 = “somewhat worried,” 3 = “not worried at all”) 
and we recoded the variables such that high values indicate more worries (0 = “not worried at all,” 1 = 
“somewhat worried,” 2 = “very worried”).  
 Including only respondents who answered all of the seven closed-ended items resulted in a final 
sample size of 371,649 observations across 62,188 unique respondents, with an average of 5.98 records 
per respondent (Min = 1, Max = 17, SD = 5.27). Mean age across all observations is 48.47 years (Min = 
16, Max = 105, SD = 17.55) and 52.63% of all observations are female.  
Following the block of closed-ended worry items, the SOEP questionnaires included an open-
ended question asking for “any other worries.” Depending on the survey mode, either respondents or 
interviewers wrote down text answers, which typically only contained a small number of key words. 
These text data were cleaned according to the procedure described in Rohrer et al. (2017). For the purpose 
of the present study, it is mainly of interest whether or not respondents provided an answer to this open-
ended question. 
Additionally, in each survey wave, at the very end of the questionnaire, respondents reported their 
life satisfaction on a single item measure ranging from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely 
satisfied).8 
Results 
Worries across the years  
Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents who reported being “very worried” about a specific 
domain (Panels A-G), as well as the percentage of respondents who answered the open-ended question 
                                               
7 The sample size of the SOEP was drastically increased in 2000, which is why we chose this starting point for our 
analyses; 2016 was the last available data wave when we ran the analyses. 





(Panel H), across calendar years, thus offering a descriptive summary of time trends in the items. To give 
an impression of the responses to the open-ended question, Figure 2 offers a visualization of the most 
frequently reported worries in the 2016 survey wave. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of SOEP respondents reporting being very worried about a specific domain (Panel A-G) and 






Figure 2: 25 most frequently used words in 2016 describing “other worries,” with font size reflecting word 
frequency. Notice that “refugee politics” corresponds to a single word in German (“Flüchtlingspolitik”), which we 
decided not to decompose to preserve more detailed information 
The numbers show that the worries of SOEP respondents changed over time. Worries about the 
general economic situation peaked from 2003 to 2006, and then again in 2009 and 2010 before returning 
to a comparably low and stable level since 2014 (Figure 1, Panel A). This trend mirrors the peak of 
unemployment in Germany in the years after 2000 and the worldwide financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 
(Figure 3). Across the years, the mean level of worries about the general economic situation was highly 





<.001. Similarly, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 3, economic worries peaked when GDP growth 
was depressed. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of SOEP respondents reporting being very worried about the general economic situation 
plotted against the unemployment rate in percent of the total labor force, and GDP per capita growth in annual 
percent (World Development Indicators, The World Bank).  
In contrast, worries about peace were especially pronounced in 2003 (Figure 1, Panel D), the year 
of the Iraq War. Furthermore, we can observe the general and more recent trend that respondents reported 
increased worries about peace, the development of criminality in Germany, immigration to Germany, and 





respondent's concerns in the context of the so-called European migrant crisis, including both worries 
about the immigrants as well as reactions to immigration. This is further corroborated by the top 25 words 
in 2016, as depicted in Figure 2: respondents worried about refugees, the state of Europe and the 
European Union, as well as about the new German right-wing party, AfD (“Alternative for Germany,” 
Kroh and Fetz 2016), which is increasingly popular since being established in April 2013. 
In contrast to these domains of concern, on average, respondents reported the same levels of 
worries about their personal health across the survey waves. To some extent, this underlines the validity 
of the answers because there is little reason to expect that worries about one’s health should have 
systematically fluctuated over the course of the years included in the analysis. Of course, nevertheless 
there was considerable intra- and inter-individual variance in worries about health. In contrast to worries 
about the public political situation, worries about one’s health might rather be a “private matter,” thus not 
fluctuating in sync across respondents.9 
Interestingly, the response rate to the open-ended question about "other worries" showed 
comparably little change over time, peaking in 2004 at about 18%, followed by a slow decline, with a 
bump in 2012 and 2013, ultimately leveling off slightly above 10%. The peak for reporting “other 
worries” was reached when the unemployment rate peaked in Germany, probably because it directly 
affected the lives of a large number of respondents; in contrast, more recent worries about immigration 
and refugees co-occur with only minor increases of “other worries.” This might suggest that these “other 
worries,” for most respondents, captured worries that are “private” in the sense that they are hardly 
affected by e.g. recent political events or other incidents that affect the whole population at the same time. 
Indeed, a topic analysis of the answers to this open-ended question in the SOEP between 2000 and 2011 
revealed that “future of children” and “health of family” were the most frequently occurring “other 
worries” (Rohrer et al., 2017). 
Worries across the life course  
To investigate how worries changed with the respondent’s age, we ran multilevel models with 
respondents nested within the observations using the R package lme4, using a restricted maximum 
                                               
9Furthermore, this might underline the quality of the survey data, since unfortunate placement of the worry items 
could have introduced systematic but invalid differences between the years. Every year, the worry items are 
included in the last part of the questionnaire, following blocks of questions about employment and income. 
Hypothetically, more detailed assessments of health in some, but not all of the survey years, could have led to 
temporal spikes in health-related worries (as the health items preceded the worry items); however, data suggest that 





likelihood estimator. All models included age, age^2, and age^3 in order to allow for the estimation of 
smooth age trajectories.10 Furthermore, in order to capture historical events affecting a specific calendar 
year, we controlled for survey year by using dummy variables for all years except the reference year of 
2000. The model includes individual fixed-effects to account for dependencies among observations. 
Note that we did not include any time-varying covariates such as income, household size, or 
number of children into our central analyses. The effects of chronological age – the passing of time – are 
necessarily mediated by other processes, such as role changes (e.g. job market entry, retirement, and 
family formation) or age-associated differences in health and cognition. Controlling for these mediating 
variables would obscure the actual age effect (overadjustment bias, cf. e.g. Schisterman, Cole, & Platt, 
2009) and, in the most extreme case, cause age effects to disappear: An age effect net of everything that 
changes with age would be zero, as the sheer passing of time in itself cannot have a meaningful effect. To 
offer an illustration and a reductio ad absurdum of the so-called “ceteris-paribus approach” 
(Blanchflower & Oswald, 2017): The effect of age on mortality (death by natural causes) would disappear 
if we “controlled for” all conceivable health parameters down to the cellular level and we might predict 
an infinite lifespan based on such a model. Thus, we consider it more appropriate to report our central 
analyses without the inclusion of such time-varying covariates, i.e. the unconditional effects (cf. 
Baetschmann, 2014).  
However, models controlling for time-varying covariates to investigate the marginal effect of age 
without socio-economic influences are standard in epidemiology and economics. Blanchflower and 
Oswald (2017) argue that, in principle, neither approach is better than the other: they answer different 
research questions. Thus, to provide additional information to researchers interested in the marginal 
effect, to demonstrate the robustness of our central conclusion, and to allow for comparison with previous 
studies, we report a supplementary analysis taking into account time varying covariates.  
First, we ran generalized linear mixed-effects models with a logit-link function for the single 
worry items, predicting whether a respondent reported being “very worried” (as opposed to “not worried” 
or “somewhat worried”). In almost all cases, the coefficients of the dummy-variables for survey year 
indicate significant differences between the calendar years, which is not surprising given the large sample 
size. Furthermore, they closely mirror the purely descriptive results in Figure 1, which is why we do not 
discuss the effects of the calendar year here again, instead focusing on the model-implied age trends.  
                                               
10In addition, we also ran models using age categories. Results were overall in line with the models including age as 





Figure 4 shows the predicted odds ratio of respondents being “very worried” about a specific 
domain (i.e. odds or reporting being “very worried” divided by odds of being less than very worried; 
Panels A-G) and the odds of reporting “other worries” (Panel H) in the reference year, 2000. For example, 
the model implies that the odds of reporting being very worried about criminality (Panel E) for 
respondents over the age of 70 exceeded two, which means that they were twice as likely to report being 
very worried than to not report being very worried. Notice that all age trends (i.e., the compound tests of 
the three age coefficients) are statistically significant at p < .001, which is not a surprise given the large 






Figure 4: Age trajectories of odds of being very worried about a specific domain, i.e. odds or reporting being “very 
worried” divided by odds of being less than very worried (Panel A-G) or reporting “other worries” (Panel H) in the 
reference year 2000, as implied by multilevel models. Note that the range of the y-scales is different for panel E and 





Second, we generated a worry score by averaging all seven worry items for each observation. 
Across all observations, this measure had satisfying reliability with Cronbach’s α = .72. The grand mean 
of this score is 1.10, indicating that the overall mean answer across all respondents, all waves, and all 
items is close to “somewhat worried” (SD = .42). This worry score was used as the dependent variable in 
a linear multilevel model. Figure 5 shows the model implied worry scores by age in the reference year 
2000. Figure 5 additionally reports the implied trajectory from a model in which a number of time-
varying covariates11 were included. In this model, the age increase appears slightly steeper; but, as 
previously discussed, we consider the trajectory without such covariates more interpretable. 
 
Figure 5: Model implied mean worry scores by age in the reference year 2000, scale ranges from 0 (“not worried at 
all” in all domains) to 2 (“very worried” in all domains). “With covariates” refers to the model implied trajectories 
                                               
11Number of individuals in the household (categorical predictor: 1, 2,…, 7 and more), number of children in the 
household (categorical predictor: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and more), disability status (yes/no), income, self-rated health (rated 





when controlling for household size, children in household, disability status, children in the household, income, 
employment status and self-reported health status. 
Mean worry scores increased across the age span until around age 65, with an average change of 
0.09 SD per ten years of age. The overall trend is sustained by four of the seven items: Worries about 
personal health, peace, the development of criminality, and immigration to Germany all significantly 
increased with age. Additionally, older respondents are increasingly likely to use the open-ended question 
to express their worries. However, this general trend is somewhat qualified by the item concerning the 
general economic situation, which follows a hump shape, the item worries about the protection of the 
environment that follows a more complex age pattern with only slight age changes, and the item 
concerning worries about hostility against foreigners, which shows a clear negative age trend.  
Furthermore, data are compatible with decreases of worries in old age. Additional analyses using 
age groups descriptively indicate that the mean worry score slightly declined among the oldest (86-105) 
and this trend could be attributed to declines in worries in five  domains late in life (general economic 
situation, hostility towards foreigners, peace, development of criminality, protection of the environment, 
general economic situation, immigration to Germany). However, the number of data points in this oldest 
age group (N = 4,056) is considerably smaller than e.g. in the second oldest age group (76-85, N = 
21,711). Thus, we consider it premature to assert a late life decline in worries. 
Overall, in some sense the age profile of the mean worry score (Figure 5) is a counterpart to the 
well-known age profile of well-being: the strong increase of worries up to age 50 is mirrored by a 
decrease of satisfaction with life. Then, the almost flat line beyond age 60 is in line with the development 
of satisfaction with life in older age as we show in the following section. Motivated by this similarity, we 
next investigate how the age trends in worries relate to age trends in life satisfaction. 
The relationship between age trends in worries and life satisfaction 
The analyses of well-being by means of “happiness research” is a booming research field, 
especially in economics (Frey 2008), but also in psychology, sociology, political science, and public 
policy (Diener et al. 2009). As its name implies, “happiness research” often focuses on the positive side of 
humans’ subjective experience, such as affective well-being or life satisfaction as a cognitive measure. 
Age trends on such constructs are investigated in depth, but the conclusions are not as clear as one might 
wish.   
For example, Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) find, for the US and European countries, 





old people are not well represented in most surveys. In line with such a pattern, Cheng, Powdthavee and 
Oswald (2017) find evidence for a midlife nadir in life satisfaction in their investigation of trends within 
respondents using longitudinal data from four different longitudinal studies. Boarini et al. (2012) find a 
similar U-shape in the Gallup World Poll and, furthermore, report that this trend also holds for affect 
balance, an affective measure of well-being that captures to what extent positive emotions exceed 
negative emotions. Stone et al. (2010) suggest that global well-being and positive hedonic well-being 
generally has U-shaped age profiles showing increased well-being after the age of 50; in contrast, 
negative hedonic wellbeing (including worries) is elevated through middle age and then declines. In line 
with the peak in negative hedonic states, Oswald and Tohamy (2017) provide evidence for increased 
suicide rates of women in midlife. Schwandt (2016) suggest that the overall U-shaped pattern arises 
because of unmet expectations in middle age: Young adults might overestimate their future life 
satisfaction, leading to regret in midlife.  
However, the narrative of the U-shaped trajectory is not uncontested. Kassenboehmer and 
Haisken-DeNew (2012) suggest that accounting for fixed effects and respondent experience in the panel 
leads to a flat trajectory. Newer studies attempt to separate age, period, and cohort effects on the level of 
life satisfaction and to consider the different durations of longitudinal study participation (Baetschmann, 
2014). Baetschmann suggested that the total U-shape effect is small in magnitude (0.4 scale points on a 0 
to 10 scale with an SD of 1.81), thus being compatible with findings of flat trajectories. Based on SOEP 
data, he finds that, for Germany, life satisfaction is on average mildly decreasing up to age 55, followed 
by a hump shape with a maximum at age 70, followed by a steep decline toward the end of respondents’ 
lives (Gerstorf et al., 2008).  
So far, this study investigates worries, which are arguably located at the negative end of the well-
being continuum. As we find positive age trends in worries, it might be interesting to consider whether 
the age trends in worries can, in part, explain age trends in life satisfaction, a positive measure of well-
being. Thus, we run additional exploratory analyses, this time modelling life satisfaction as a function of 
age and calendar year, following the statistical approach that does not “control” for mediators as outlined 
before. Considering the more complex age trajectory of well-being suggested by Baetschmann (2014), the 
model additionally contains age to the power of four. We then re-run the model including all seven worry 
items (dummy-coded) into the analyses. All worry items had significant main effects on life satisfaction 





to Germany, but positive effects for worries about the environment, peace, criminality, and foreigners. 
These partly unexpected main effects are not the focus of the present study.12  
Figure 6 shows the model-implied age trajectories for both versions of the model. The blue line 
shows that in our standard model (without including worries), life satisfaction steadily decreases until age 
50. Instead of a hump peaking at age 70 (cf. Baetschmann, 2014), in our model, an almost flat line 
follows prior to the well-known terminal decline in very old age. In the model including the worry items, 
the age trend appears to be slightly different and more in line with the frequently reported U-shape: The 
decline until age 50 is followed by a hump shape that peaks at 70 prior to the terminal decline, which now 
appears less pronounced. Note that the red line, i.e. the age trajectory controlling for the seven worry 
items, indicates a higher level of life satisfaction only because it is estimated for “no worries” on all seven 
worry items.  
Importantly, even after statistical control for worries, age trends on life satisfaction overall 
persisted (p < .001). Comparing the variance attributable to the age variables, partial R-squared indicates 
that the worry items do not pick up substantial parts of the age effects: Age accounted for 0.24% of 
variance in life satisfaction without considering the worry items, and for 0.21% when the worry items 
were included in the model. This suggests that worries and life satisfaction—though both being indicative 
of subjective well-being—are not interchangeable and cannot be reduced to a simple one-dimensional 
construct: While the age trends in both measures complement each other, they provide non-redundant 
information. Multiple measures with different focuses must be taken into account in order to gain a more 
complete picture of SWB (cf. Diener, Scollon & Lucas, 2003). 
 
                                               
12Note that in models considering one worry item at a time, each worry domain has a negative effect on life 
satisfaction, thus the reversal of sign for some coefficients in the combined model is attributable to the overlap 






Figure 6: Model implies life satisfaction scores in the reference year 2000 with and without statistical control for the 
seven worry items, scale ranges from 0 (“completely dissatisfied”) to 10 (completely satisfied). Values in model 
with worries at 0 (“no worries”) on all seven items. 
 
General Discussion 
To summarize our results, we investigate how worries in Germany change across time and age. 
We find that world events influence worries. For example, worries about peace peak in 2003, the year of 
the Iraq War, and corresponding patterns are observable for other items. Importantly, worries about both 
immigration and hostility against foreigners have increased substantially since 2014, with refugees and 
the rise of the right-wing political party, AfD (“Alternative for Germany”), the objects of “other worries” 
as reported in open ended text format in 2016. 
Furthermore, results indicate that worries about different domains increase with age, which held 
true for worries about the general economic situation, one’s health, peace, criminality, and immigration; 





increase in worries is a result of a kind of biased selection of items that are more relevant to older adults 
than those who are younger. However, if this is true, one would probably expect that younger adults 
would increasingly use the open-ended question to voice additional worries that plague them, whereas we 
observed in our data that the chances of responding to the open-ended question also increases with age. 
Lastly, we find that worries are not able to account for the age trends in life satisfaction, underlining that 
these two measures are not redundant. 
Rumination—in the field of psychology defined as repetitive negative thoughts about the past or 
present—is linked to a wide range of negative outcomes, including impaired problem solving and 
inhibition of instrumental behavior (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, Lyubomirsky, 2008). Likewise, worries—
repetitive negative thoughts about potential threats in the future—are linked to impaired decision making 
(e.g., Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990).  
However, from this, it does not necessarily follow that our results suggest that age accompanies 
worse decision making. Studies investigating the consequences of worries frequently employ measures 
that ask for worries in an unspecified manner (e.g., “I am always worrying about something”) and might 
thus mostly tap the negative affective component of worries. This dimension of negative affect is tightly 
link to the personality dimension of neuroticism—in fact, the tendency to worry is part of many 
personality scales measuring trait neuroticism—which actually tends to decline with increasing age 
(Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006).  
In contrast, our study addresses worries about specific life domains that are potentially shaped by 
conscious cognition, such as the evaluation of potential threats. Such processes are not necessary 
maladaptive: “Worry is reasonable” (MacLeod, Williams, & Bekerian, 1991) as it is a strategy to prevent 
negative events from happening and prepare for the potential consequences (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, 
Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). In line with this notion, a study shows that individuals suffering from 
pathologic worries are characterized by enhanced processing of potential future losses (Mueller, Nguyen, 
Ray, & Borkovec, 2010).  
Thus, the age trend in worries we find might reflect an increased allocation of attention to 
potential threats and losses with age. Importantly, such a trend is not necessarily maladaptive or irrational, 
but could likely affect the way in which older individuals make economic decisions. Their increased 
sensitivity for potential threats and losses could lead to increasing risk aversion and, indeed, older 
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Individual Importance Weighting of Domain Satisfaction Ratings Does Not Increase Validity 
 
Julia M. Rohrer & Stefan C. Schmukle 
 
Abstract 
Bottom-up models of life satisfaction are based on the assumption that individuals judge the overall 
quality of their lives by aggregating information across various life domains, such as health, family, and 
income. This aggregation supposedly involves a weighting procedure because individuals care about 
different parts of their lives to varying degrees. Thus, composite measures of well-being should be more 
accurate if domain satisfaction scores are weighted by the importance that respondents assign to the 
respective domains. Previous studies have arrived at mixed conclusions about whether such a procedure 
actually works. In the present study, importance weighting was investigated in the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID; N = 5,049). Both weighted composite scores and moderated regression analyses 
converged in producing the conclusion that individual importance weights did not result in higher 
correlations with the outcome variable, a global measure of life satisfaction. By contrast, using weights 
that vary normatively across domains (e.g., assigning a larger weight to family satisfaction than to 
housing satisfaction for all respondents) significantly increased the correlation with global life satisfaction 
(although incremental validity was rather humble). These results converge with findings from other fields 
such as self-concept research, where evidence for individual importance weighting seems elusive as best. 
The final version of this article which underwent further copyediting & typesetting has been published in 
Collabra: Psychology. 
Additional online material and analysis scripts necessary to reproduce the analyses can be retrieved from 
https://osf.io/m3ezs/. The data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics can be retrieved from 
http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/. Parts of this manuscript were written while the first author was visiting 
the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research supported by a travel stipend from the 






Individual Importance Weighting of Domain Satisfaction Ratings Does Not Increase Validity 
 
What happens in people’s heads when they are asked how satisfied they are with their lives? So-
called bottom-up models are based on the assumption that people assess the conditions of their lives 
across various life domains and then aggregate these pieces of information to arrive at their judgments 
(e.g., Lucas, 2004). Beginning with the seminal work on life satisfaction by Campbell, Converse, and 
Rodgers (1976), the idea that this aggregation takes into account weights that vary between respondents 
has been popular. These weights might reflect respondents’ personal values (Oishi, Diener, Suh, & Lucas, 
1999) and can potentially be influenced by factors such as the surrounding culture (Oishi, Diener, Lucas, 
& Suh, 1999) or respondents’ age (George, Okun, & Landerman, 1985).  
Such a weighted bottom-up model has a strong intuitive appeal: Surely, it makes sense to expect 
that somebody who cares a lot about his or her family will be less satisfied with his or her life in general 
when family life is unsatisfactory, whereas somebody who does not care about relatives would probably 
not be affected too much. A similar importance-weighted model has been popular in self-esteem research 
and can be traced back as far as William James’ “The principles of psychology” (see Marsh, 2008), 
illustrating the high face validity of such models. In addition, the application of a weighted bottom-up 
model opens the door to an appealing individualized approach to the measurement of life satisfaction: 
What is most important to respondents should carry the largest weight in a composite score for assessing 
their quality of life. 
In theory, such an idiographic approach is fairly straightforward. Respondents report (a) how 
satisfied they are with the central domains of their lives and (b) how important these domains are, either 
by ranking them or by assigning ratings. Researchers can then weight the satisfaction ratings by the 
importance ratings to arrive at a personalized composite score of overall life satisfaction. Such a measure 
should be a more valid reflection of how respondents’ lives are going than a simple sum score, which 
represents the implicit assumption that each domain is equally important—in order words, a sum score is 
equal to applying uniform weights to all domains. The weighted composite score can then be used to 
predict other variables. Most studies on this topic have relied on correlations between the weighted 
composite score and a global measure of life satisfaction to gauge the validity of the weighted score. If 
the weighted composite score shows a higher correlation than an unweighted sum score, this is interpreted 
as evidence that the importance weighting hypothesis has merit. 
However, empirically speaking, studies have frequently failed to find evidence that importance 





by others. For example, Philip, Merluzzi, Peterman, and Cronk (2009) found that a weighting algorithm 
did not improve a measure of health-related quality of life in a sample of 194 cancer patients. Likewise, 
Russell, Hubley, Palepu, and Zumbo (2006) found that weighted scores from the Injection Drug User 
Quality of Life Scale did not outperform unweighted scores in a sample of 241 adults. Wu (2008) also 
found that weighted scores were not superior to unweighted scores in a sample of 167 undergraduates. 
Note that all these sample sizes were rather small, and the statistical power these studies had to find 
evidence for the superiority of the weighting procedure was quite low when considering that importance 
weighting effects should show up as between-subject interactions. 
Trauer and Mackinnon (2001) argued that such multiplicative weighted scores are “undesirable 
and unnecessary” (p. 579). Their first point (i.e., the scores are undesirable) addresses the idea that the 
reliability of weighted sum scores is somewhat questionable. To offer an intuitive explanation for this: 
Both satisfaction and importance are not measured perfectly, and thus, the multiplication of these two 
already flawed measures might exacerbate measurement error. On top of this, Trauer and Mackinnon 
claimed that weighted average scores are hard to interpret and sensitive to the scaling of composites. For 
example, results are not invariant under a simple linear transformation of importance ratings.13 Their 
second point (i.e., the scores are unnecessary) addresses the idea of weighted models in general: Domains 
incorporated into questionnaires have already been selected to be universally relevant, and thus, they 
should be important to almost all respondents. Importance weighting should therefore be unnecessary.  
Moderated regression analyses provide another way to assess importance weighting that is built 
on less strict assumptions and provides a test that is insensitive to the scaling of the importance ratings 
(i.e., arbitrary linear transformations of the scale do not affect the conclusions). In moderated regression 
analyses, the outcome (usually a global measure of life satisfaction) is predicted from satisfaction ratings, 
importance ratings, and their interactions. A positive interaction between a person’s satisfaction in a 
specific domain and the respective importance rating is interpreted as evidence for the merit of 
importance weighting. In comparison with composite scores, moderated regression analyses distinguish 
                                               
13 Note that the authors claimed that the results they obtained were not invariant under a linear transformation of 
“one or both elements of the composite” (Trauer & Mackinnon, 2001, p. 581). However, this claim is not correct. If 
the satisfaction ratings are linearly transformed before the weighted composite score is calculated, the resulting 
score is a linear transformation of the weighted composite score of the untransformed satisfaction ratings. Thus, a 
linear transformation of the satisfaction ratings will not affect, for example, correlations between the composite 
score and other variables. But this does not hold for a linear transformation of the importance ratings because they 





between the main effects of satisfaction and importance ratings and their interactions, whereas weighted 
composite scores result in one estimate in which these sources of variation are intertwined.  
Wu and Yao (2006) claimed to have found evidence for the merit of importance weighting in 
such moderated regression models using a sample of 130 undergraduate students, but once again, this 
sample size seems fairly small for reliably assessing the evidence for between-subject interactions. 
Tiefenbach and Kohlbacher (2015) analyzed a larger sample of 2,900 Japanese adults and arrived at a 
more qualified conclusion that importance ratings moderated the association between domain satisfaction 
and happiness in some but not all domains. Note that it is close to impossible to actually interpret the 
estimates from their moderated regression analysis because the model included satisfaction with “purpose 
in life (regarding work, hobbies, and social contributions)” as a predictor of the outcome, which was 
happiness. This is arguably less of a life domain and more an alternative potential outcome measure, and 
judging from the results reported in the paper, it obscured any association between the other life domains 
(e.g., finances, health, family) and happiness. 
Hsieh (2003, 2012) put forth multiple arguments for weighting by domain importance, claiming 
that weighting works when domains are ranked from most to least important instead of being rated on 
separate rating scales. Both studies were based on the same data from 90 telephone interviews of 
respondents aged 50 years or older, but again, this sample might be considered underpowered. An 
additional study by Hsieh (2016) used latent class analysis and cluster analysis to identify different 
patterns of importance, then argued that the relationship between global life satisfaction and a domain-
satisfaction composite varied between groups. Whereas this study used a larger sample (N = 2,164; note 
that this is the same sample as used in Campbell et al., 1976, who did not find evidence for importance 
ratings as weighting factors), the analytical approaches at best provide a very indirect test of importance 
weighting. 
Lastly, Marsh and Scalas (2017) developed a taxonomic SEM approach , which is conceptually 
comparable to the moderated regression approach but also incorporates latent factors, to test individually 
weighted-average models and included a quality of life measure as one of their empirical illustrations. 
Even though the focus of their article is on methodological matters rather than well-being, it might well 
constitute the most rigorous test of importance weighting and life satisfaction to date, including a sample 
of 2,751 respondents in their mid-twenties and employing a systematic SEM approach. Overall, the 
authors concluded that the interactions between satisfaction and importance explained only very little 
unique variance, providing only very limited support that individuals do in fact apply importance 





Taken together, the current state of the literature does not allow for a clear and straightforward 
judgment to be made about importance weighting. Results are difficult to integrate across studies because 
different authors used different methodological approaches (weighted scores, moderated regression 
analyses, the complex classification procedure used by Hsieh, 2016, and the SEM approach by Marsh & 
Scalas), included variable and sometimes questionable selections of “life domains” that rendered the 
results uninterpretable (e.g., “purpose in life satisfaction”), and investigated effects in very different 
samples (e.g., undergraduates from Taiwan vs. individuals aged 50 or older in Chicago), most of them not 
even remotely representative of any general population that a researcher might be interested in. In 
addition, the sample sizes have frequently been surprisingly small given that the effects of interest are 
between-subject interactions, and thus, the extent to which we know anything about the validity of 
importance weighting remains unclear. 
The Present Study 
In this study, we investigated importance weighting in a large-scale sample of the U.S. adult 
population: Does the effect of satisfaction in a certain life domain on global life satisfaction vary by the 
importance assigned to the respective domain?  
As preparatory work, we first analyzed the basic characteristics of domain importance and 
domain satisfaction items because these would determine whether an empirical importance weighting 
approach is promising to begin with. For example, if all respondents agreed that a certain domain was 
important (or unimportant), then there would actually be no need to collect importance ratings. In 
addition, we tested the relationship between domain importance and domain satisfaction. Many 
researchers conducting studies investigating importance weighting have implicitly assumed that these two 
types of ratings are orthogonal, which would admittedly render the weighting procedure somewhat more 
conceptually “elegant.” Thus, the researchers who conducted such studies did not report whether they 
found a correlation between the importance and satisfaction ratings. However, if the importance of a 
specific domain was strongly correlated with satisfaction with that domain, the information provided by 
the two items would become redundant.  
To test the central hypothesis of importance weighting, we applied weighting procedures and 
moderated regression analyses, and we discuss the methodological properties of both approaches. We 
elaborate on the crucial distinction between normatively as compared to individually weighted scores, an 
issue that has caused lots of confusion and false claims in the literature. At last, we report additional 








Data came from the well-being supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 2016. 
The PSID is a nationally representative panel survey of families in the United States, produced and 
distributed by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. In 2016, a questionnaire on 
well-being (PSID-WB; Freedman, 2017) was added to the study. This was a brief self-administered 
instrument completed via the internet or on paper. The supplement covered various measures of well-
being, personality, and activities, as well as ability measures. 
Heads of household and their partners who were at least 30 years old by December 31, 2015 were 
eligible for the PSID-WB in 2016. Eligible panel members were mailed an invitation letter including the 
web address of the survey and login credentials and received a $20 check upon completing the survey. Of 
the 10,689 eligible cases, 8,341 responded (78% response rate). Age ranged from 30 to 97, M = 50.55, SD 
= 14.37. Women comprised 56.35% of the sample.  
Assessment of Global Life Satisfaction  
Respondents answered the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & 
Griffin, 1985), one of the standard measures in well-being research consisting of five items (e.g., “In most 
ways, my life is close to my ideal”) rated on a 5-point response scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = 
somewhat disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = somewhat agree, 5 = strongly agree). The scale 
had a satisfactory reliability of α = .89. Due to missing responses to SWLS items, 160 respondents had to 
be excluded. 
Assessment of Domain Importance 
Respondents reported the importance of 10 different life domains on a 5-point response scale (0 = 
not at all important, 1 = a little important, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = very important, 4 = extremely 
important).14 The phrasings of the items as well as domain abbreviations that will be used throughout the 
manuscript can be found in Table 1. 
                                               
14 Note that, as mentioned earlier, the weighted composite scores are not invariant under linear transformations of 
the data. Setting not at all to zero captures the idea that if a respondent says a domain does not matter at all, it is not 
incorporated into the weighted composite. However, we additionally ran all analyses with a different coding scheme 
(1 = not at all important, 2 = a little important, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = very important, 5 = extremely 






Exact Wording of the Domain Importance and the Domain Satisfaction Items in the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics Well-Being Supplement 
Domain 
abbreviation 
Domain importance item Domain satisfaction item 
 Below is a list of things that may or may not be important 
to you. How important are each of the following to you? 
How satisfied are you with each of 
the following? 
Housing Living in a house or apartment that I like My house or apartment 
Area Living in a city or place that I like The city or place that I live in 
Job Having an interesting job My job 
Finances Being financially secure or not having to worry about 
money 
My financial situation 
Hobbies Having hobbies or things that I like to do outside of work My hobbies 
Marriage Having a happy marriage or romantic relationship My marriage or romantic 
relationship 
Family Having a good family life My family life 
Friends Having good friends My friendships 
Health Being in good health My health 
Faith Having a strong religious faith My faith 
Note. Domain abbreviations are used throughout the manuscript to refer to the respective life domains. 
Assessment of Domain Satisfaction 
Respondents reported their satisfaction with 10 different life domains on a 5-point response scale 
(0 = not at all satisfied, 1 = a little satisfied, 2 = somewhat satisfied, 3 = very satisfied, 4 = completely 





satisfaction items, an additional response option, Does not apply to me, was available because not all 
items (e.g., job, marriage/relationship, faith) applied to all respondents. We restricted analyses to all 
respondents who answered all 10 domain satisfaction items. Thus, the final sample consisted of N = 5,049 
respondents (54.03% women) with a mean age of 46.82 years (SD = 12.13). Notice that because of this 
considerable sample size, even small effects can reach the conventional threshold for statistical 
significance. In the results section, we will consider changes in R² to evaluate whether importance 
weighting is able to account for meaningful amounts of variance in the outcome variable. 
Software 
All analyses were run in R (R Core Team, 2017) using the RStudio environment (RStudio Team, 
2016) and a number of R packages. More precisely, dplyr (Wickham & Francois, 2016), tidyr (Wickham, 
2016), and reshape2 (Wickham, 2007) were used for data wrangling; psych (Revelle, 2016) was used for 
the Fisher z-transformation and to compare the correlation coefficients; lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) was used 
to fit the regression model with constrained coefficients; and mlr (Bischl et al., 2016) was used for cross-
validation. All plots were generated with the help of ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009). 
Results and Discussion 
Mean Scores and Variances of Domain Importance and Satisfaction 
For all of the 10 domains, the mean importance ratings were high, exceeding a mean response of 
3 (very important; see Table 2). By contrast, the mean satisfaction ratings were not that close to the upper 
end of the response scale but were still fairly high: All mean scores fell above the middle response option 







Descriptive Statistics and Correlations with the Satisfaction With Life Scale of the Domain Importance 
Ratings in the PSID (N = 5,049). 
 Importance rating (% of sample)    
Correlation 
with SWLS Domain   0 1 2 3 4  M SD  
Housing 0.50 1.72 13.90 44.94 38.94  3.20 0.78  .163 
Area 0.48 1.51 12.10 46.92 39.00  3.22 0.75  .178 
Job 0.79 1.78 16.30 45.99 35.14  3.13 0.80  .134 
Finances 0.14 0.53 8.16 38.60 52.56  3.43 0.68  .004 
Hobbies 0.46 2.81 20.20 44.37 32.16  3.05 0.82  .139 
Marriage 0.69 1.15 7.03 28.38 62.75  3.51 0.74  .203 
Family 0.04 0.38 2.22 25.85 71.52  3.68 0.54  .184 
Friends 0.53 2.69 17.57 38.66 40.54  3.16 0.84  .166 
Health 0.12 0.22 3.19 30.94 65.54  3.62 0.57  .113 








Descriptive Statistics and Correlations with the Satisfaction With Life Scale of the Domain Satisfaction 
Ratings in the PSID (N = 5,049). 
 Satisfaction rating (% of sample)    
Correlation with 
SWLS Domain   0 1 2 3 4  M SD  
Housing 3.60 5.76 27.09 42.92 20.62  2.71 0.97  .497 
Area 2.67 5.88 24.90 43.91 22.64  2.78 0.95  .422 
Job 5.37 8.46 31.17 37.41 17.59  2.53 1.04  .473 
Finances 12.66 11.51 37.04 28.66 10.14  2.12 1.14  .589 
Hobbies 4.54 10.93 32.62 36.98 14.93  2.47 1.02  .450 
Marriage 7.63 6.85 17.90 34.09 33.53  2.79 1.20  .522 
Family 1.74 3.43 17.49 41.59 35.75  3.06 0.91  .555 
Friends 2.16 6.75 25.65 41.67 23.77  2.78 0.95  .454 
Health 4.38 6.85 29.83 39.37 19.57  2.63 1.01  .457 
Faith 1.49 6.67 22.24 36.09 33.51  2.93 0.98  .318 
 
Given the high mean scores, it was no surprise that variability in the importance ratings was 
generally low. For example, 71.52% of respondents reported that their family was extremely important to 
them, and 25.85% rated their family life as very important, whereas only 0.42% used one of the two 
lowest response options (a little important, not at all important). The domain that showed the highest 
variability in importance, faith, still showed considerable concentration at the high end of the scale: 
49.97% reported that having a strong religious faith was extremely important to them, and 25.27% rated it 
very important, whereas 9.88% of respondents chose one of the options at the lower end of the scale (a 





Domain satisfaction scores consistently showed somewhat higher variability for all domains 
except for faith, although the responses were still concentrated in the upper half of the scale. For example, 
35.75% of respondents reported that they were completely satisfied with their family life, and 41.59% 
were very satisfied, whereas only 5.17% used one of the two response options at the lower end of the 
scale (a little satisfied, not at all satisfied). 
Taken together, both the domain importance and domain satisfaction ratings tended to be located 
in the upper half of the response scales. In particular, domain importance items tended to be answered 
with the two highest response options and accordingly, variability in those items was limited. 
The Relationship between Domain Importance and Domain Satisfaction 
Are respondents more or less satisfied with domains that are more important to them? This 
question could be approached from two perspectives.  
From a variable-centered perspective, it would make sense to ask: Are respondents who rate 
health as more important compared with other respondents more/less satisfied with their health compared 
with other respondents? This question can be answered by investigating bivariate correlations between 
domain importance and domain satisfaction, and this analysis would result in one estimate per domain 
(across all respondents). 
From a person-centered perspective, it would make sense to ask: Are respondents who rate health 
as more important compared with other domains more/less satisfied with their health compared with 
other domains? This question could be answered by investigating profile correlations between domain 
importance ratings and domain satisfaction ratings, and this analysis would result in one estimate per 
respondent (across all domains). Note that the two approaches are intrinsically related on a statistical level 
(see Allik et al., 2015). 
Variable-centered perspective. For all domains except for finances, there was a positive 
correlation between domain importance and domain satisfaction. Respondents who rated domains as more 
important also said they were more satisfied with these domains. This can be seen in Figure 1, which 
depicts the correlations between all importance items and all satisfaction items. Of interest at this point is 
the diagonal within the highlighted square in the bottom right corner of the figure. These correlations 
ranged from r = .21 (housing, job) to .45 (faith), all ps < .001, with the exception of the domain finances 
that showed quite a distinct pattern with virtually no correlation between the importance of finances and 
satisfaction with finances (r = .01, p = .473): Respondents who gave high ratings to the importance of 





This positive association for the nine other domains could reflect a general tendency to report 
high importance and high satisfaction—respondents might have a certain tendency to reply with high or 
low values on the rating scales, and this might result in the appearance that satisfaction and importance 
are correlated for each of the domains. However, these correlations were specific to the domains to some 
extent, ruling out the possibility that this alternative explanation could completely account for the pattern. 
Although there were some substantial correlations across domains (e.g., the importance of friends was 
correlated r = .24 with satisfaction with hobbies; see Figure 1), the correlations linking importance and 
satisfaction for the same domain always numerically exceeded the cross-domain correlations except for 
the domain of finances (which was an exception to begin with, since it did not show a correlation between 
importance and satisfaction ratings). 
Note that using Spearman’s rank order correlation instead of Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
changed the specific numbers only slightly but did not affect the pattern at all; see the additional figure 






Figure 1. Intercorrelations between all domain importance and domain satisfaction items. N = 5,049; rs exceeding 
.03 are significant at p < .05, rs ≥ .04 at p < .01, and rs ≥ .05 at p < .001. 
 
Person-centered perspective. For each respondent, a profile correlation coefficient was 
calculated by correlating the 10 importance items with the 10 corresponding satisfaction items. 
Correlations were Fisher z-transformed before averaging, and afterwards, they were transformed back 





importance and domain satisfaction was r = .34 and was significantly different from zero, t(4,210) = 
29.89, p < .001. As a robustness check, we standardized each variable separately and then recalculated the 
profile correlations. This procedure ensured that the individual profile correlations were not confounded 
by normative patterns (i.e., correlations between the mean importance ratings and the mean satisfaction 
ratings across respondents). Again, the average profile correlation coefficient (r = .30) was positive and 
significantly different from zero, t(5,048) = 45.77, p < .001.15 
Taken together, importance and satisfaction were mildly correlated both across and within 
respondents. Respondents who considered a domain more important were also more satisfied with that 
domain. Furthermore, on average, if a respondent considered a specific domain more important than other 
domains, he or she was also more satisfied with that domain than with other domains. However, all these 
correlations were moderate in magnitude, so that there is no reason to assume that importance and 
satisfaction ratings are essentially redundant. 
Incremental Validity in Predicting Global Life Satisfaction: Weighting 
Does weighting by importance increase the amount of variance that domain satisfaction ratings 
can explain in a measure of global life satisfaction? Previous studies have frequently calculated 
importance-weighted composite scores and have subsequently compared the correlation between these 
weighted scores and simple (unweighted) sum scores. 
To arrive at an individually weighted composite score, each domain satisfaction rating for each 
respondent is multiplied by the respective domain importance rating, all these products are summed, and 
the sum is divided by the number of all importance ratings made by the respective respondent, that is: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 =
∑(𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖∗𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖)
∑(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖)
 with i indexing the different life 
domains.  
This individually weighted composite was highly correlated with the simple sum score of all 
domain satisfaction ratings (i.e., the unweighted composite; r = .993, p < .001, see Table 4). Thus, it was 
no surprise that the correlations between the two different composites and the SWLS score were of almost 
                                               
15 Note that the degrees of freedom differed depending on whether the scores were standardized or not. Without 
standardization, it was not possible to calculate profile correlations for all respondents because some respondents 
gave the same reply to all importance items/all satisfaction items, and this made it impossible to calculate 
correlations. In addition, the profile correlation was 1 for some respondents, and these correlations resulted in 
infinite Fisher z-scores that had to be excluded before averaging. These problems no longer occurred after the 





exactly the same magnitude: Whereas the correlation between the unweighted composite and the SWLS 
score equaled r = .695 (R² = 48.37%), the correlation between the individually weighted composite and 
the SWLS score was only slightly higher, r = .699 (R² = 48.86%).  
Table 4 
Intercorrelations between the different composite scores of domain satisfaction items and the Satisfaction 
With Life Scale (SWLS) in the PSID (N = 5,049). 
 SWLS Individually w. composite Normatively w.  composite 
Simple sum score .695 > .999 .993 
Normatively w. composite .698 .993  
Individually w. composite .699   
 
Disentangling Normative and Individual Weighting 
Note that there are two potential (noncompeting) explanations for the incremental validity of the 
individually weighted composite.  
First, the added validity might stem from a normative importance effect. For example, 
respondents might collectively assign higher weight to a domain that is indeed more strongly related to 
global life satisfaction across respondents (e.g., family satisfaction in our data). In a regression model 
predicting global life satisfaction from only the domain satisfaction scores, this would show up as 
different regression coefficients for the various domain satisfaction ratings. Such a normative importance 
effect would make it superfluous to collect individual importance ratings if the researcher knew which 
domains the average respondent considered more important.  
Second, the added validity might stem from idiosyncratic/individual importance effects. For 
example, a respondent who assigns a higher weight to a specific domain might be more strongly 
influenced by this specific domain, regardless of the importance assigned to this domain by other 
respondents. In a regression model predicting global life satisfaction from domain satisfaction, domain 
importance, and their interaction, this would be indicated by a significant interaction effect. In order to 





This distinction between normative and individual weighting has played a crucial role in 
discussions about importance weighting in self-esteem research (Marsh, 2008; Marsh & Scalas, 2017) and 
is equally relevant when it comes to importance weighting in well-being research, as the substantive 
interpretation differ substantially: Only individual weighting supports the common notion that the 
individual applies importance weights when forming summative judgments. 
To assess the evidence for the two different types of weighting within the multiplicative 
weighting framework, we additionally generated a weighted composite score in which the individual 
domain satisfaction ratings were multiplied by the average importance rating across respondents. This 
normatively weighted composite, 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒 =
∑(𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖∗𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖))
∑(𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖))
, assigns different weights to different domains; however, the domain-
specific weights are the same for all respondents.  
This normatively weighted composite was highly correlated with both the unweighted composite 
(r = .9997 , p < .001) and the individually weighted composite (r = .993, p < .001). Its correlation with the 
SWLS score was comparable to the other two composites (r = .698, R² = 48.74%), and it significantly 
outperformed the unweighted composite according to Steiger’s test (t = 11.49, p < .001) in predicting the 
SWLS score (an additional 0.38% of explained variance). It is important to mention that the individually 
weighted composite score did not significantly outperform the normatively weighted composite score, t = 
0.68, p = .490. According to these numbers, it seemed sensible to prefer the more parsimonious model in 
which only one weight was assigned to each domain across all respondents instead of a model that was 
based on the assumption that there are interindividual differences in the weights. 
Incremental Validity in Predicting Global Life Satisfaction: Moderated Regression 
As outlined above, an alternative approach to assessing whether the effects of domain satisfaction 
on global life satisfaction are weighted by domain importance uses moderated regression analyses. To 
highlight both the commonalities and the discrepancies between the two statistical approaches, we ran a 
sequence of regression models to lead up to the key model that we used to test for the incremental validity 
of the importance weighting procedure. 
In the initial model (Model 0), the SWLS score was predicted from the 10 satisfaction ratings, and 
all coefficients were constrained to equality. This model is based on the assumption that each of the 10 
domains is equally important for life satisfaction. Estimating this model yielded exactly the same results 
as correlating the unweighted composite (i.e., the simple sum score of all 10 items) with the SWLS score. 





explained; this equals the square of the correlation between the unweighted composite and the SWLS (see 
above). 
In the next step, the SWLS score was predicted from the 10 domain satisfaction ratings, but the 
coefficients of the predictors were allowed to vary as in regular linear regression analyses. This 
conceptually corresponds to the normatively weighted score above. All in all, R² = 51.63% of the variance 
in the SWLS score was explained by the predictors (coefficients in Table 5, column Model 1). However, 
it would be unfair to compare this number with the performance of the composite scores or the regression 
model with fixed coefficients: Because the coefficients for each life domain are estimated from the data, 
the model becomes flexible. Thus, this model will necessarily provide a better fit to the data at hand than 
the composite scores or the regression with fixed coefficients, but this does not necessarily generalize to 
new samples from the same population because the regression might overfit sample-specific noise (for an 
accessible introduction to the problem of overfitting, see Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017). Therefore, we 
additionally evaluated the performance of this regression model using 10-fold cross-validation. This 
resulted in a slightly lower performance of R²cross-validated = 51.14%. Thus, it might be more realistic to 
estimate that 51.14% – 48.37% = 2.77% of the variance could be explained when allowing the weights of 
the domains to vary. Note that this model conceptually mirrors the normatively weighted composite score 
described above: The weights are allowed to vary between domains, but for each domain, they are the 
same across all respondents. However, in the case of the normatively weighted composite score, the 
weights for the domains are derived from the average importance ratings. In the regression model 
described here, they are estimated from the data and informed by the outcome, the SWLS score. The 
regression model provided a better fit to the data than the normatively weighted composite score (R² = 
48.49% vs. R²cross-validated = 51.15%), indicating that it might be preferable to estimate the weights assigned 
to the domains from the data instead of based on the importance ratings, although the difference was 
rather small. 
The next model additionally incorporated the main effects of the 10 domain importance ratings. In 
this model, again, slightly more variance in the outcome could be explained (R² = 51.94%, R²cross-validated = 
51.22%, coefficients in Table 5, column Model 2), and a model comparison test indicated that this 
difference was statistically significant, χ²(10) = 11.178, p < .001. Thus, the domain satisfaction 
importance ratings themselves were seemingly able to explain some variance in the global life satisfaction 
measure, but the gain was negligible. 
The key regression model that was computed to test the importance weighting hypothesis 
additionally incorporated the interaction between the domain satisfaction ratings and the corresponding 





satisfaction ratings, 10 domain importance ratings, and 10 interactions. In this model, again, slightly more 
variance was explained (R² = 52.20% or 0.26% more than the model without interaction terms, 
coefficients in Table 5, column Model 3) in the sample, and a model comparison indicated that this was 
statistically significant, χ²(10) = 9.08, p = .003. However, results from the cross-validation procedure 
indicated that this model was not really preferable to the previous model, R²cross-validated = 51.23%. When 
comparing the models without cross-validation, the interaction terms seemed to contribute to the 
prediction of the outcome—but the performance of the two models was virtually identical when applied 
to new data points from the same population (ΔR² = .00009, or 0.009%), suggesting that the in-sample 
performance of the more complex model might be an overestimation due to an overfitting of the data at 
hand. Thus, results from the moderated regression analyses did not support the idea of individual 
importance weighting.16 
Table 5 
Results of Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) score from 
Satisfaction and Importance across All Domains 
Predictor 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
b p b p b p 
Housing Satisfaction 0.09 < .001 0.09 < .001 0.09 < .001 
 Importance   0.01 .396 0.01 .725 
 Interaction     - 0.04 .002 
Area Satisfaction 0.03 .013 0.02 .056 0.02 .041 
 Importance   0.04 .016 0.03 .027 
 Interaction     - 0.03 .805 
Job Satisfaction 0.08 < .001 0.08 < .001 0.08 < .001 
 Importance   0.01 .517 0.01 .325 
 Interaction     0.02 .055 
Finances Satisfaction 0.18 < .001 0.18 < .001 0.18 < .001 
 Importance   - 0.06 < .001 - 0.05 <.001 
 Interaction     0.02 .124 
Hobbies Satisfaction 0.02 .040 0.02 .079 0.02 .062 
 Importance   0.00 .878 0.00 .902 
 Interaction     0.00 .972 
Marriage Satisfaction 0.11 < .001 0.10 < .001 0.10 < .001 
                                               
16 Furthermore, when comparing to the model only including domain satisfaction, it becomes clear that even in 
combination, the importance ratings and their interactions with satisfaction only contribute a completely negligible 





 Importance   0.03 .076 0.03 .071 
 Interaction     0.01 .303 
Family Satisfaction 0.17 < .001 0.17 < .001 0.17 < .001 
 Importance   0.01 .579 0.02 .430 
 Interaction     0.01 .444 
Friends Satisfaction 0.03 .020 0.04 .003 0.03 .012 
 Importance   - 0.02 .098 - 0.03 .016 
 Interaction     - 0.03 .002 
Health Satisfaction 0.08 < .001 0.09 < .001 0.09 < .001 
 Importance   - 0.04 .048 - 0.03 .087 
 Interaction     0.01 .666 
Faith Satisfaction 0.00 .816 0.00 .776 0.00 .714 
 Importance   0.00 .924 0.00 .942 
 Interaction     0.00 .793 
R²in sample (and Δ to previous model) 51.63%  51.94% (+ 0.31%) 52.20% (+ 0.26%) 
R²cross-validated (Δ) 51.15%  51.22% (+ 0.07%) 51.23% (+ 0.01%) 
Note. N = 5,049. Predictors were centered before the interaction terms were calculated (Interaction = 
Satisfaction * Importance) 
 Alternative and Additional Analyses 
To further explore the data—and to rule out that we failed to find support for importance 
weighting because we chose the wrong analytic approach—we ran several additional analyses. 
Moderated regression with within-subject centered weights. Furthermore, we modified the 
moderated regression approach to be closer aligned with a person-centered perspective. For that purpose, 
we centered the importance ratings within subjects so that they express relative importance of a domain 
compared to the other domains. We then used these within-subject centered importance ratings in a 
moderated regression as described above. The performance of this model (R² = 52.24%, R²cross-validated = 
51.22%) was virtually identical to the performance of the moderated regression model without within-
subject centering described above (R² = 52.20%, R²cross-validated = 51.23%) and thus also failed to support 
the idea that the importance*satisfaction ratings play a large role.             
Including more respondents but less domains. Seven of the domains (Housing, Area, Finances, 
Hobbies, Family, Friends, Health) are arguably relevant to almost all respondents, regardless of their 
living circumstances. We thus repeated the central moderated regression analyses only including those 
seven domains, which allows for a considerably larger sample size (N = 7,439, 56.27% female, Mage = 
49.79, SDage = 13.92). In Model 0 (predicting the SWLS from domain satisfaction while constraining all 





satisfaction ratings to vary (Model 1) again resulted in an improved prediction of the SWLS (R² = 
51.71%, R²cross-validated = 51.54%). Incorporating the main effects of the domain importance ratings (Model 
2) again lead to a statistically significant (p < .001) change in R², with a small gain of 0.23% (R² = 
52.05%, R²cross-validated = 51.77%). Including the importance*satisfaction interactions in the last step 
(Model 3) again lead to a statistically significant increase in R² (p < .001), but once again cross-validation 
led to the conclusion that the difference was completely negligible (R² = 52.28%, R²cross-validated = 51.85%). 
Modeling global life satisfaction as a latent factor. Given that global life satisfaction was 
assessed with five items, it is also possible to model this construct as a latent factor and assess importance 
weighting in an SEM context. We thus specified a model in which we predicted global life satisfaction 
(latent factor loading on the five items of the SWLS) from the ten domain satisfaction ratings, the ten 
domain importance ratings, and the ten satisfaction*importance interactions. This approach also allows us 
to include respondents with missing values on any of the included items using the full-information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator, resulting in a sample size of N = 5,518.1 In Model 0, we restricted 
the coefficients of all domain satisfaction ratings to equality and set the coefficients of the importance 
ratings and the satisfaction*importance interactions to 0. In Model 1, we allowed the coefficients of the 
domain satisfaction ratings to vary. In Model 2, we additionally freed the loadings of the importance 
ratings, and in Model 3, we finally freed the loadings of the interaction terms. Table 6 summarizes the 
results of these analyses. 
Table 6 
Results of SEM Analyses Predicting Global Life Satisfaction from Domain Satisfaction, Domain 
Importance, and their Interaction (N = 5,518) 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fit measures    
CFI .963 .977 .978 .979 
RMSEA .030 .024 .025 .025 
                                               
1 Notice that we excluded respondents who reported that the domains partner, job, or faith did not apply, because 





SRMR .017 .009 .009 .009 
Information criteria    
AIC 428769 428494 428480 428472 
BIC 428875 428659 428711 428769 
Variance of global life satisfaction explained   
R² 53.08% 56.06% 56.40% 56.67% 
 
The largest increase in model fit as well as explanation of variance can once again be seen 
moving from Model 0 to Model 1, when allowing the coefficients of the satisfaction ratings to vary by 
domain, ΔR² = 2.98%, ΔAIC = -275 , ΔBIC = -216. When additionally estimating the coefficients of the 
importance ratings, Model 2, the conventional fit measures CFI, RMSEA and SRMR remain virtually 
unchanged, and an additional 0.34% or variance in global life satisfaction can be explained. According to 
the AIC, this model is to be preferred over Model 1, ΔAIC = -14. However, at this point, the BIC already 
indicates that the more parsimonious Model 1 should be preferred, ΔBIC = 52, as it puts a heftier penalty 
on the increased complexity given the large sample size.  
Likewise, when additionally estimating the coefficients of the interaction terms, fit measures 
remain virtually unchanged, somewhat more variance in global life satisfaction can be explained (ΔR² = 
0.27%), which parallels the observation that including the interaction terms in the moderated regression 
increased the (unadjusted) R². Again, according to the AIC, this more complex model is somewhat 
preferable (ΔAIC = -8), but the BIC again imposes a larger penalty on the added complexity, resulting in 
a preference for the more parsimonious previous model (ΔBIC = 58). The disagreement between the two 
information criteria can be explained by the fact that they are trying to answer different questions (as 
succinctly summarized in Aho, Derryberry, & Peterson, 2014): Whereas BIC seeks to figure out which 
model is correct in the sense that it might have generated the data (thus performing well in simulations in 
which data are generated under a relatively simple process), AIC focuses on the best prediction in the 
context of incompletely specified or infinite parameter models (“All models are wrong, but some are 
more useful”). Hence, whether or not one interprets these analyses as in favor of importance weighting or 





(assuming that it is finite). In any case, it should be clear that the amount of variance that could be 
explained by the interaction terms was very small, less than 0.3% within the sample. 
Investigating Importance Weighting in Single Domains 
To further explore why the importance weighting procedure was not able to account for additional 
variance in global life satisfaction, we took a close look at the single domains: At least one previous study 
claimed that importance weighting varies between domains (Tiefenbach & Kohlbacher, 2015). 
Inspection of the model coefficients of the moderated regression model including all domains 
(Table 5, column Model 3) revealed some “counterintuitive” estimates. Two domains indicated 
statistically significant interactions according to the conventional cut-off of p < .05; however, both were 
negative and thus ran counter to the notion of importance weighting: bhousing_interaction = -0.04, p = .002 and 
bfriend_interaction = -0.03, p = .002. However, this was not surprising given the data at hand. The satisfaction 
ratings were correlated across the different domains with values ranging from r = .25 (area satisfaction 
with satisfaction with faith) to .57 (housing satisfaction with area satisfaction; family satisfaction with 
satisfaction with friends) as can be seen in Figure 1; similarly, the domain importance ratings were 
intercorrelated (ranging from .07 to .65). Consequently, for example, it was possible to explain about 47% 
of the variance in satisfaction with friends from the other domain satisfaction ratings. If all domain 
satisfaction ratings were simultaneously included in the model, and the effect of satisfaction with friends 
were examined, this would be akin to holding satisfaction in the nine other life domains constant and 
looking only at the associations between the remaining 53% of the variance and the outcome variable. In 
other words, the effect of satisfaction with friends reflects the effect of being more or less satisfied with 
one’s friends than would be predicted on the basis of both satisfaction with and the importance of the 
other life domains. When holding everything else constant, the interpretation of the interaction term 
becomes even more complex.  
This reflects the so-called “perils of partialling” (Lynam, Hoyle, & Newman, 2006): The effect of 
a single predictor variable in a regression model when all other predictor variables are held constant might 
no longer reflect the actual effect of interest. Thus, the regression model including all domains is not 
suitable for determining which domains importance weighting does or does not occur in. To further 
explore differences between the domains, a different analytic procedure is necessary. Thus, we 
additionally ran moderated regressions in which we predicted the SWLS score from importance, 
satisfaction, and their interaction, but this time, we investigated only one domain at a time. The results 







Results of Independent Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) 
from Satisfaction and Importance Separately for Each Domain  
 Domain importance Domain satisfaction Importance*satisfaction 
Domain b p b P B p 
Housing 0.06 < .001 0.42 < .001 -0.01 .529 
Area 0.09 < .001 0.35 < .001 0.01 .464 
Job 0.04 .001 0.37 < .001 0.05 < .001 
Finances 0.00 .966 0.43 < .001 0.03 .030 
Hobbies -0.03 .023 0.38 < .001 0.02 .074 
Marriage 0.02 .171 0.37 < .001 0.04 < .001 
Family 0.00 .963 0.51 < .001 0.03 .091 
Friends -0.04 .012 0.41 < .001 0.02 .037 
Health 0.02 .290 0.37 < .001 0.02 .166 
Faith -0.04 .001 0.31 < .001 0.06 < .001 
Note. N = 5,049. Each line in the table represent an independent regression model. We centered the 
predictors before we calculated the interaction terms (Interaction = Satisfaction * Importance). 
 
Some domains clearly showed the expected interaction pattern. For example, at the average level 
of job importance, a 1-point increase in job satisfaction predicted a 0.37 point increase in global life 
satisfaction, p < .001. In addition, at the average level of job satisfaction, a 1-point increase in job 
importance also predicted a (comparably small) 0.04 point increase in global life satisfaction, p = .001. A 





satisfaction on life satisfaction was more pronounced, p < .001. For example, for a person who rated his 
or her job as 1 point more important than the average, a 1 point increase in job satisfaction was associated 
with a 0.37 + 0.05 = 0.42 increase in global life satisfaction. The same pattern emerged for satisfaction 
with marriage (pinteraction < .001) and satisfaction with faith (pinteraction < .001). The domains finances and 
friends also showed this pattern in weaker form and met the conventional threshold for significance, 
whereas the domains hobbies (pinteraction = .074) and family (pinteraction = .091) displayed trends in the same 
direction that could be labeled “marginally significant” at best. It is noticeable that only one domain—
housing—showed a negative interaction (b = -0.01, p = .529), but it was still very close to zero. Overall, 
the pattern of results thus suggests that there is some evidence for the expected moderating effect of 
importance ratings although the strength of this evidence varies across domains. However, as we will 
show below, it is questionable whether these coefficients should be interpreted as support for a bottom-up 
weighted model of life satisfaction. 
Is Importance Weighting Domain-Specific? 
The high intercorrelation within the importance ratings and within the satisfaction ratings raised 
the question of whether these interactions are sufficiently specific. For example, it is possible that there is 
a general satisfaction factor (being satisfied with life domains in general), and a general importance factor 
(viewing life domains as important in general). Both might reflect either substantial factors, such as 
personality predispositions, or, in a more mundane interpretation, response biases. The two factors might 
interact such that individuals who think that life domains per se are important tend to be more strongly 
affected by their domain satisfaction when judging their overall life satisfaction. Such a general 
explanation would not go well with a bottom-up weighting approach that implies that the importance that 
a person ascribes to family (and not, e.g., the importance the person ascribes to health) moderates the 
effect of family satisfaction on general life satisfaction.  
As a first (crude) test of such an alternative explanation, we ran a moderated regression model in 
which we predicted global life satisfaction from the average satisfaction rating across all domains, the 
average importance rating across all domains, and the interaction of these two factors. Indeed, in this 
model, we found a statistically significant (p = .005) interaction between the average satisfaction and 
average importance, albeit with a negative coefficient, which does not support this alternative account. 
Furthermore, model performance (R² = 48.55%) was worse than in the domain-specific moderated 
regression analyses reported above. 
Subsequently, we took a more detailed look at potentially unspecific moderating effects of 





and testing their interaction. For example, we ran one regression model in which we predicted the SWLS 
score from job satisfaction, importance of faith, and their interaction. To support the bottom-up 
importance-weighted life satisfaction model, the resulting interaction would ideally be smaller than the 
interaction between job satisfaction and job importance and smaller than the interaction between 
satisfaction with faith and importance of faith. Figure 2 visually represents the resulting interaction 







Figure 2. Interaction coefficients from the regression analyses in which each of the 10 importance ratings were 
combined with each of the 10 satisfaction ratings to predict the SWLS score. Analyses with concordant domains 






In looking at the overall picture, there was no clear pattern supporting the hypothesis that the 
importance of specific life domains distinctly moderated the association between satisfaction with the 
respective domain and the SWLS score. Only three domains at least tended toward the pattern that could 
be expected.  
First, the coefficient for the interaction between job importance and job satisfaction was the 
largest of the job importance interactions (Panel C, highlighted). However, the interaction between job 
importance and hobby satisfaction had a similar magnitude (also Panel C). Furthermore, the effect of job 
satisfaction was affected by the importance of finances to a similar degree (Panel D).  
Second, the coefficient for the interaction between the importance of marriage and marriage 
satisfaction was the largest of the marriage importance interactions (Panel F, highlighted). However, to a 
lesser degree, the importance of marriage also potentially moderated the effects of satisfaction in a couple 
of other life domains (also Panel F). Furthermore, the interaction between marriage satisfaction and 
importance of finances was comparable in magnitude (Panel D).  
Third, the coefficient for the interaction between the importance of faith and satisfaction with 
faith was the largest of the faith importance interactions (Panel J, highlighted). The importance of faith 
did not interact with any of the other domain satisfaction ratings. Importance of friends also moderated 
the association between the SWLS score and satisfaction with faith (Panel H) but to a lesser extent. 
Taken together, only one out of 10 life domains yielded clear support for domain-specific, distinct 
importance weighting. Note that the results remained almost unchanged when all involved variables were 
standardized prior to analysis (i.e., when the coefficients reflected β-weights), we provide the 
corresponding figure on the OSF (https://osf.io/m3ezs/). 
General Discussion 
All things considered, our results suggest that importance weighting of domain satisfaction 
ratings does not improve the prediction of global life satisfaction. Moderated regression analyses 
including all ten life domains simultaneously indicated that the inclusion of the interactions between 
importance and satisfaction did not increase the amount of variance explained when taking into account 
the increased model complexity. Investigating only one domain at a time revealed somewhat more 
promising results with significant interactions for multiple domains. However, cross-domain analyses 
suggested that most importance-satisfaction interactions were not domain specific, which is why these 





satisfaction in a specific life domain is modulated by the importance of that life domain (and not the 
importance of a different life domain). 
It is worth noting that this lack of support for importance weighting on the individual level aligns 
with similar findings from another substantive field, the research of self-esteem. In self-esteem research, 
the idea that one’s overall self-evaluation is the importance-weighted average of self-evaluations in 
specific domains has been popular for more than 100 years (Marsh, 2008), but empirical support has been 
lacking and methodologically deficient. 
How come that, despite its intuitive appeal and plausibility, importance weighting fails to find 
support in empirical data? In the following, we will outline possible explanations, which are not mutually 
exclusive, and their implications for further research. 
Lack of Variability in Importance Ratings 
The chance of detecting individual importance weightings is zero if all respondents consider a 
certain domain to be equally important (see also Schimmack, Diener and Oishi, 2002). For example, in 
the present study, respondents almost unanimously agreed that a satisfying family life is important, 
decreasing the chances of finding importance weighting in that domain—if it is important for everyone, 
the same coefficient should hold for everyone, even if the weighted bottom-up model holds true. In 
addition, any variation in the importance ratings for domains that are considered unanimously important 
might not necessarily reflect actual differences in the importance of the respective domains but rather 
interindividual differences in the usage of the response scale, making it even less likely to detect the 
desired specific moderating effect of importance ratings. 
This explanation is somewhat supported by our findings regarding the domain of faith. For this 
domain, importance ratings showed the highest variability, and they were also only weakly correlated 
with importance of other life domains. In line with a weighted bottom-up model, the importance of faith 
moderated the association between satisfaction with faith and global life satisfaction but not the 
association between satisfaction with any other life domain and global life satisfaction.  
Researchers could try to purposefully include life domains that are likely rather unimportant to 
part of the respondents. For example, one could draw inspiration from the study by Schimmack, Diener 
and Oishi (2002), which included the performance of the Illini men’s basketball team as one “domain of 
life” with which respondents can be more or less satisfied. Of course, inclusion of such domains is 
somewhat opposed to the aim of a comprehensive assessment of well-being with as few items as possible, 





out, well-being measures that include multiple domains are intentionally constructed in a way so that the 
included domains are relevant for all respondents, making them particularly unsuited to detect the effects 
of importance weighting. 
Lack of Reliability and/or Validity of Importance Ratings 
Campbell et al. (1976, pp. 87-88) already noted that the stability of their importance ratings was 
lower than those of other measures, raising questions about the reliability of single-item importance 
measures. Of course, a lack of reliable variance in single item importance measures would also limit their 
validity and hence undermine chances to detect the effects of importance weighting. This could be solved 
by the inclusion of more reliable multi-item measures. For example, the SEM approach suggested by 
Marsh and Scalas (2017) explicitly makes use of multiple importance indicators per domain to estimate a 
latent importance factor. However, it should also be noted that even using multi-item measures, Marsh 
and Scalas failed to find evidence for individual importance-weighting for global self-esteem. So at least 
in that related research domain, a lack of reliability does not seem to be the explanation for the failings of 
individual importance weighting. 
Apart for low reliability, there are other potential reasons for a lack of validity of domain 
importance ratings. Russel and Hubley (2005) provided a comprehensive list of arguments that have been 
raised against the validity of importance ratings, including various response biases and simple lack of 
insight. 
Alternative Moderators of the Association Between Domain and Global Satisfaction 
In addition, one could argue that the weights assigned to various life domains when forming a 
global life satisfaction judgment are not weighted according to importance, but rather according to some 
other variable. For example, values have been suggested as one moderator (Oishi, Diener, Suh, & Lucas, 
1999). Schimmack, Diener and Oishi (2002) stressed the role of accessibility: Only information about life 
domains that is accessible when the global evaluation is formed can affect it.  And on a different level of 
abstraction, developmental stage might moderate the association, as there is robust evidence that the 
effect of income and life satisfaction changes across the life course (Cheung & Lucas, 2015). 
Invalidity of the Individually Weighted Bottom-Up Model 
One might also doubt whether individuals do in fact assign varying weights to different life 
domains when forming their global satisfaction judgment. As Marsh and Scalas (2017) point out, 
individually weighted models are intuitively very compelling. However, that does of course not imply 





different life domains are actually homogeneous across respondents, in line with normative weighting. 
This could potentially be tested without further consideration of the points mentioned above 
(psychometric features of importance ratings, suitability of importance as moderator) by taking a 
repeated-measures approach and assessing relationships between domain satisfaction and global 
satisfaction judgments within subjects. In such a study, it should be possible to detect interindividual 
differences in domain weighting, assuming that such differences are somewhat stable (see e.g. 
Schimmack & Oishi, 2005, for evidence that chronically accessible information seems more important 
than temporarily accessible information). 
Using the Wrong Criterion 
So far, we have assumed that it is sensible to evaluate the validity of individual importance 
weighting by using a global life satisfaction measure as criterion. The validity of global life satisfaction 
measures has been extensively illustrated by countless plausible associations with, for example, non-self-
report measures and life circumstances (Diener, Inglehart, & Tay, 2003). However, that does not imply 
that global life satisfaction judgments necessarily reflect an optimal (or optimally weighted) assessment—
people might assign exaggerated weights to certain life domains (e.g., income; Kahneman, Krueger, 
Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2006) and underestimate the weight of others. Thus, it could be promising to 
evaluate importance weighting against alternative criterion variables (as in e.g., Marsh & Scalas, 2017; 
see Russell & Hubley, 2005, for a similar argument) in the same way in which global life satisfaction 
judgments have been evaluated, and even to compare the performance of weighted composite scores 
against those of global judgments. In fact, there is some empirical evidence that domain satisfaction 
judgments (without individual weighting) are approximately as valid as global life-satisfaction judgments 
(Zou, Schimmack, & Gere, 2013). Hence, it might be misguided to rely on global measures to assess the 
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Age Patterns in the Correlates of Subjective Well-Being Across Europe 
 
Julia M. Rohrer & Rui Mata 
 
Abstract 
Motivational and developmental theories suggest that goals and values can change across the life span, 
leading to shifts in the importance assigned to life domains. Such motivational shifts can determine the 
importance of these domains for subjective well-being. We contribute to uncovering potential 
consequences of motivational changes by documenting age patterns in three correlates of subjective well-
being—social relations, income, and health—across 32 nations using cross-sectional data from the 
European Social Survey (2002–2016; N = 255,065). Social relations and health indicators are more 
strongly associated with well-being in old age whereas the association between income and well-being 
follows an inverse U-shape. Country characteristics can account for some between-country variation in 
the importance of each domain but do not overall moderate the age-related patterns. Results suggest that 
the sources of well-being are systematically different across the life span, with health and social relations 
mattering most at older ages. 









Age Patterns in the Correlates of Subjective Well-Being Across Europe 
 
Social life, health, and income are thought of as major determinants of happiness and subjective 
well-being (Graham, Laffan, & Pinto, 2018), but to what extent does the relative importance of these 
factors change across the life span and how universal are such patterns? In the present study, we map the 
age trajectories of the correlations between subjective well-being and three life domains—social life, 
income, and health—in a large sample of respondents from several European countries. Our work aims to 
describe how the correlates of subjective well-being differ across age groups and further our 
understanding of how contextual factors, such as countries’ wealth, contribute to the differential 
importance of major life domains to subjective well-being across the life span.  
Age Patterns in Three Major Correlates of Subjective Well-Being: Social Life, Health, and Income 
Theories of subjective well-being postulate that subjective well-being is influenced by multiple 
factors and that the relevance of each to one’s overall subjective well-being can vary as a function of 
individuals’ values or goals changing across the life course (e.g., Oishi et al., 1999). For example, 
motivational theories suggest that social roles can be construed as an age-graded sequence of 
opportunities to realize developmental goals, with individuals shifting their roles from peers, to partners, 
and parents across the life course (Erikson, 1963; Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010). Taking up such 
roles is associated with shifting priorities in one’s social, work, and health goals across the life span and 
likely change the importance of these factors for one’s overall well-being (Ebner, Freund, & Baltes, 2006; 
Heckhausen et al., 2010).  
The extant motivational theories cannot be used to precisely predict the timing and magnitude of 
such shifts and the empirical literature on the importance of specific factors across the life span is mixed, 
with few studies having compared several factors within the same study. This state of affairs makes it 
difficult to estimate the relative contribution of several factors to subjective well-being across the life 
span. In what follows, we provide a short summary of past work on three major correlates of subjective 
well-being, social life, income, and health, that are the focus of our study and illustrates the need for 
further evidence detailing the patterns across the full adult life span. 
Considering the domain of social life, there in considerable evidence concerning life span changes 
in social life (Wrzus, Hänel, Wagner, & Neyer, 2013) and related motivational theories (Cartsensen, 
2006), and meta-analytic evidence suggests that the link between social integration and subjective well-
being may be stronger for older individuals (Pinquart & Sörensen, 2000). However, few studies have 





non-linear pattern, with social contact having the highest association with well-being among younger and 
older adults, with a dip among the middle-aged.  
Considering income, some authors reported that the correlation increases with age (Spreitzer & 
Snyder, 1974; Lun & Bond, 2016). However, others have observed a more complex pattern with income 
having the highest effect in middle age and smaller effects among the older and younger (George et al., 
1985; Margolis & Myrskylä, 2013), and this pattern has been further corroborated by cross-sectional and 
longitudinal evidence from three different countries (Germany, UK, and Switzerland; Cheung & Lucas, 
2015). 
Lastly, concerning health, results are inconsistent: Some studies found that the correlation 
between well-being and self-assessed health was higher in old age (Spreitzer & Snyder, 1974; George et 
al., 1985; Margolis & Myrskylä, 2013); others could not detect any age differences in the association 
(Herzog, Rodgers, & Woodworth, 1982; Siedlecki, Tucker-Drob, Oishi, & Salthouse, 2008); at least one 
study found that the strength of the association was lower among older respondents (Lun & Bond, 2016). 
Concerning cross-country differences, it is known that countries differ in their age-related 
trajectories of well-being (Graham & Pozuelo, 2017; Steptoe, Deaton, & Stone, 2015) and in the timing 
of adoption of specific social roles that could be relevant for individual motivations and well-being 
outcomes (Bleidorn, Klimstra, Denissen, Rentfrow, Potter, & Gosling, 2013). However, a systematic 
examination of cross-country differences in the correlates of subjective well-being is lacking, as only a 
few countries have been typically examined when assessing the role of specific factors in determining the 
sources of variation across countries (Cheung & Lucas, 2015). We offer such an examination here 
because it can provide clues about which country-level factors give rise to specific age-related patterns in 
the correlates of well-being. For example, countries differ in the extent to which older people rely on 
assistance from relatives and other social contacts, with this function being fulfilled by governmental or 
market-based social security nets in wealthier countries (see e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990, for a typology 
of welfare states), which could have important consequences for subjective well-being (Jo Cox 
Commision on Loneliness, 2017). As a consequence, it would be important to assess whether such 
country-level factors, such as wealth and provision of social benefits, contribute to different shapes of 
correlates of subjective well-being across the life span.  
The Present Study 
Past theoretical and empirical work suggests that the association between several correlates of 
subjective well-being may change across the life span, but empirical findings have been inconsistent and 





associations between subjective well-being and three central correlates, social relations, income, and 
health, in data from a repeated cross-sectional survey.  
Our study has three noticeable features that contribute to identifying the age patterns on the 
correlates of well-being. First, we compare the age patterns concerning three different life domains from a 
large study, the European Social Survey, which has not been used to date to address these issues. Second, 
where possible, we use several indicators per domain to allow assessing the generalizability of results 
from single indicators (e.g., frequency of social contacts, contact with friends) to the domain of interest 
(e.g., social). Third, we explore the variation in the age-related patterns across countries and test the 
ability of country indicators (e.g., wealth) to account for the age-related patterns. Such an exploration 
promises to yield insights into the extent to which findings generalize across countries but also potentially 
provide clues about which socio-economic factors might contribute to such patterns.  
Method 
The European Social Survey 
Data came from waves 1 to 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS), which were collected in a bi-
annual rhythm from 2002 to 2016 in a repeated cross-sectional design (i.e., individuals are not followed 
over time). The European Social Survey is archived and distributed by the Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data (2016a, 2016b), which also offers an extensive documentation of the methodology of data 
collection (https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/). To ensure that country-level correlations were 
meaningful, analyses were (where indicated) weighted using the post-stratification weights, which take 
into account varying sampling probabilities for certain groups within countries as well as sampling error 
and nonresponse bias. However, because we do not intend to map out age trajectories in the correlations 
for the “average European”, we did not apply population size weights when running analyses across 
countries. Hence, smaller countries are overrepresented at the expense of larger ones in the overall 
trajectories. 
We limited analyses to respondents aged 18 to 80 who had answered all relevant questions (see 
items below). The final sample consisted of 255,065 participants (47.21% women) with an average age of 
47.97 years (SD = 16.48) from 32 different countries (smallest per-country N = 1,779 or 0.70% of the 
sample for Iceland, highest per-country N = 17,993 or 7.05% of the sample for Germany) assessed over 
eight waves of data collection (smallest per-wave N = 26,790 for the first wave, highest per-wave N = 






Subjective Well-Being. In each wave, respondents reported (a) how happy they were and (b) 
how satisfied they were with their life as a whole. Both items were answered on an 11-point response 
scale (0: Extremely happy/dissatisfied, 10: Extremely happy/satisfied) and highly correlated (r = .708) 
among all ESS respondents from the selected age range (N = 345,145). We thus averaged both items to 
arrive at a more reliable global measure of subjective well-being (subjective well-being; M = 7.01, SD = 
2.01). 
Social Life. In each wave, respondents were asked (a) how often they took part in social activities 
compared to others of the same age (1: much less than most, 2: less than most, 3: about the same, 4: more 
than most, 5: much more than most) and (b) how often they socially met with friends, relatives, or 
colleagues (1: never, 2: less than once a month, 3: once a month, 4: several times a month, 5: once a 
week, 6: several times a week, 7: every day). The two variables were only moderately correlated (r = 
.353) and given the different response scales and the different item content (comparisons to others of the 
same age vs. social activities in absolute terms), we used them as separate indicators of respondents’ 
social life. Visual inspection revealed that both variables had nonlinear associations with subjective well-
being, we thus used the logarithm of both items (which more closely fit the linear relationship) in all 
following analyses.  
Income. In each wave, respondents reported their household income. However, the response scale 
of this measure changed over the course of the ESS. In the first three waves (ESS 1-3), respondents 
reported their income on a 12-point scale for which categories were the same across countries (resulting 
in large between-country income differences on this variable). Starting from ESS 4, respondents instead 
indicated their income on a 10-point scale scaled according to country-specific deciles (effectively 
removing between-country differences in income). Although the two different income variables had 
distinctly different distributions, they led to very similar conclusions regarding the age trajectory of the 
correlation between it and subjective well-being (see also per-wave trajectories in the results section); 
therefore, we treated them as interchangeable. As expected, visual inspection of the association between 
the income variables and subjective well-being revealed that the effect was not linear, thus we use the 
logarithm of income (which more closely fit the linear relationship) in all following analyses.  
Income Satisfaction. In each wave, respondents reported on a four-point scale how they felt 
about their household’s income, which we reverse-coded so that higher scores indicated a higher 
subjective income (1: finding it very difficult on present income, 2: finding it difficult on present income, 





correlated with objective income (r = .552 when using the ESS 1–3 income variable, r = .480 when using 
the ESS 4–8 income variable) and showed an approximately linear association with subjective well-being. 
Self-Assessed Health. We will report analyses of health as a correlate of subjective well-being 
using different operationalizations: (a) Health as captured by a single-item indicator (available for all 
waves of data collection), and (b) health as captured by lists of symptoms that affected or hampered 
respondents’ daily lives (which were only available for wave 7). 
In each wave, respondents reported their subjective general health on a five-point response scale, 
which we reverse-coded so that higher scores indicated better subjective health (1: very good, 2: good, 3: 
fair, 4: bad, 5: very bad). To probe the quality of this single item measure, we investigated its association 
with the symptom measures that were collected in wave 7. Respondents indicated whether they had been 
(a) affected by and (b) hampered in their daily activities by 11 different health symptoms (e.g., heart 
problems, allergies, back or neck pain, stomach and digestion problems). We simply generated two sum 
scores, one counting the number of health problems respondents reported to be affected by, and the 
second one counting the number of health problems respondents reported to be hampered by. These two 
scores were substantially correlated (r = .678), we hence averaged them to get a single score of health 
symptoms. This score showed a substantial correlation with the single item measure of self-assessed 
health (N = 40,136;r = -.428). Furthermore, it showed an approximately linear association with subjective 
well-being, as did the single-item self-report of health. We reverse-coded the symptom measure so that it 
reflected the absence of symptoms of impaired health. This simply ensures that the correlation between 
these measures and subjective well-being has the same sign as the correlation between self-rated health 
and subjective well-being, thus facilitating comparison of the trajectories, without affecting the magnitude 
of the correlation. 
Country-Level Variables 
To be able to broadly characterize the included countries, we used the wbstats R package (Piburn, 
2018) on 13 September 2018 to download the following indicators for the years 2001 to 2018: Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in current U.S. Dollar, GDP per capita growth in annual percent, 
GINI (world bank estimate), total fertility rate (births per woman), life expectancy at birth in years, 
mortality rate under 5 (per 1,000 live births), percentage of population aged 0-14, school enrollment 
gender parity index, government expenditure on education (in percent of GDP), unemployment (total of 
labor forced modeled ILO estimate), health expenditure (per capita), old-age dependency ratio (in percent 
of the working-age population), intentional homicides (per 100,000 people), and rural population (in 





plausibly systematically shape normative life courses and hence also affect who is experiencing higher (or 
lower) subjective well-being at different age stages. However, the selection of variables was also 
necessarily constrained by which indicators were available across many years for most countries and thus 
necessarily does not reflect an in-depth assessment of the state of the countries, but rather is supposed to 
give a rough overview over dimensions on which a country might be characterized. We replaced missing 
values by first averaging the previous and the following year for the same indicator of the country (if 
available), then we carried values forward once (i.e., if previous year known, copy value of indicator), and 
lastly repeatedly carried values backward (i.e., if following year known, copy value of indicator) until no 
country indicators remained missing.  
When then ran a principal component analysis (treating each yearly record of a country as an 
observation, N = 544) and recovered three components that were all in all able to account for 62.90% of 
the variance in the 14 indicators. We rotated the components orthogonally and then predicted values to 
characterize the countries on three dimensions. The first component was marked by high GDP (λ = .32) 
but low GDP growth (λ = -.37), low child mortality (λ = -.34), high life expectancy (λ = .53) and low 
homicide rate (λ = -.45). For ease of reference, we decided to label this component wealth. In contrast, the 
second component, which we labelled fertility, was marked by a high fertility rate (λ = .52), a high 
percentage of people aged 0-14 (λ = .57) and a lower age-dependency ratio (λ = -.38). Lastly, the third 
component was characterized by high gender parity at school enrollments (λ = .42), high government 
expenditure on education (λ = .44), a low GINI coefficient (λ = .46), and low unemployment rates (λ = 
.45)—for a lack of a better term capturing all these features, we decided to label this component equality. 
Rather unsurprisingly, the first and the third component (wealth and equality) were correlated (r = .519), 
whereas the fertility components was mostly independent from the other two (rwealth = .032, requality = .081). 
Analyses  
Concerning our analytic approach, we opted to compare how the correlations between specific 
indicators of social relations, income, and health differ across age groups. Note that, conceptually, one 
can distinguish between (a) age-associated changes in the (concurrent) predictive power of various 
predictors (i.e., comparison of correlations across several age groups) and (b) age-associated changes in 
the magnitude of the effects of various predictors on subjective well-being (i.e., moderated regression 
approach). Findings from the two approaches need not necessarily converge, since variability in variables 
might change with age. We decided to focus on the former approach for multiple reasons. First, we think 
that it is closer to the question that researchers often have in mind when discussing which variables are 
better predictors of subjective well-being—with predictive power being best captured in a correlation 





language of causal effects, but inferring causality requires a stronger causal identification strategy (see 
Rohrer, 2018, for an introduction). Hence, in the present study, we attempt to answer a set of 
straightforward and descriptive research questions that could be considered as a stepping stone to future 
investigations: Do the correlations between subjective well-being and social relations, income, or health 
covary with age? And, if so, is there systematic variation across countries in these patterns that we can 
account for by considering the socio-economic characteristics of these countries?  
Between-group differences in the variables of interest could potentially affect our estimated 
correlations. For example, if women were both healthier and more satisfied with their lives, correlating 
health and life satisfaction across both genders could result in inflated estimates because the correlation 
will also capture the gender differences in mean levels. To avoid this, we removed any influences of 
gender, wave of data collection, and country on the mean levels of the variables by within-group 
standardization of the variables of interest (subjective well-being and its correlates as described above). 
For this purpose, we first formed groups based on all combinations of these three variables and 
subsequently standardized within them, taking into account the weights (i.e., so that within each 
subgroup, Mweighted = 0 and SDweighted = 1). Note that this standardization procedure is conceptually similar 
to the fixed effects approach, which has been suggested to be more suitable for cross-national analyses 
than the multilevel models more commonly applied in psychology (Möhring, 2012). 
We then computed the weighted correlation coefficient between subjective well-being and its 
correlates in various subgroups (see details below) with the help of the wtd.cor() function from the R 
package weights (Pasek, 2018). Standard errors of the correlation coefficients were calculated via 
bootstrapping, as implemented in the package; that is, for the bootstrapping procedure, cases were drawn 
with probabilities depending on their weights. 
The resulting correlation coefficients where then subjected to further analyses. Note that it would 
be desirable to apply the Fisher-z transformation before further analysis of the correlation coefficients 
(rs). However, the implementation of the weighted correlation that we used calculated bootstrapped 
standard errors around the correlation which, to our knowledge, do not readily translate into standard 
errors around the Fisher-z values. The correlations in this study are almost all between 0 and .4, a range in 
which the discrepancies between r and z are fairly small (e.g., Fisherz(.2) = .203, Fisherz(.3) = .310, 
Fisherz(.4) = .424). Hence, we deemed it acceptable to work with r instead of z. 
Because the point estimates of the correlation coefficients were based on samples of varying sizes 
(and thus vary with respects to their uncertainty), all further analyses of regression coefficients were 









weights corresponded to 
𝑛
1−𝑟²
, which means that correlations based on larger samples receive higher 
weights and higher correlations receive lower weights.  
For presentation of the overall trajectories, smoothing was applied to the correlations using 
LOESS with the standard parameters implemented in ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009); points were again 
weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error of the correlation. Analyses were run in Stata 14.2 
(StataCorp, 2015) and in R (version 3.5.0; R Core Team, 2018) using RStudio (version 1.0.143; RStudio 
Team, 2016). 
Finally, we also analyzed whether gender affected the age trajectories of the associations between 
subjective well-being and its correlates. Given the wealth of analyses we report and similar results for 
men and women, these additional analyses are provided in a supplement.  
Results 
Overall trends 
First, we attempted to get a general overview of the correlational patterns in the data. For each 
year of age between 18 and 80 and separately for each ESS wave, we calculated the weighted correlation 
between subjective well-being and its correlates. Figure 1 reports the results from these analyses. 
Social Activities. Visual inspection (Figure 1, Panel A) suggests that the strength of the 
association between self-reported social activities and subjective well-being is higher among older 
respondents. Wave-by-wave analyses regressing the correlations on age confirmed an increase in the 
association for all waves (bs ≈ 0.001 to 0.002, ps ≤ .009). Thus, it is no surprise that analyzing the 
associations for all waves jointly (controlling for the factor variable data collection wave) revealed a clear 
linear trend, b = .002, p < .001. Because George et al. (1985) had suggested a U-shape trend for social 
variables, we also tested this pattern but overall, there was only weak evidence for a quadratic effect (p = 
.063) and the negative sign of the coefficient actually implied an inverted U-shape. Hence, we stuck with 
the more parsimonious linear trajectory for further parametric analyses.  
Social Meetings. In contrast, visual inspection of the second operationalization of social 
embeddedness (Figure 1, Panel B) does not immediately reveal a clear trend. Wave-by-wave analyses 
suggested increases in the strength of the association with respondents’ age in wave 1 (b = 0.001, p = 
.004) and wave 2 (b = 0.002, p = .001), with weak evidence in wave 3 (b = .001, p = .018) and wave 7 (b 





.919) and wave 8 (p = .472). Consequently, analyzing the waves jointly did suggest an increase of the 
strength of the association with age, but the overall estimate was considerably smaller than the estimate 
for the previous item, b = .0006, p < .001. Again, we also tested a U-shaped trend, but here, we found no 
indication of such a trend (p = .707). 
Income. Visual inspection (Figure 1, Panel C) suggests an inverted U-shape of the association 
between income and subjective well-being across the life course. Hence, all further analyses regressing 
the correlation between income and subjective well-being on age always included both age and age^2 as 
predictors. Indeed, in every single wave, results suggested a quadratic effect with a negative sign (all ps ≤ 
.001), which unsurprisingly also showed in a combined regression analysis (p < .001).  
Income satisfaction. The trajectory of the association between feelings about one’s own income 
and subjective well-being across age (Figure 1, Panel D) looks very similar to the trajectory of the 
association between actual income and subjective well-being. Thus, just as for income, all further 
analyses regressing the correlation between feelings about income on age included both age and age^2. 
Again, wave-by-wave regression analysis of the z-scores indicated a negative quadratic effect in each 
single wave (all ps < .001), as did a pooled analysis across all waves (p < .001). 
Health. Visual inspection (Figure 1, Panel E) suggests that the strength of the association 
between health and subjective well-being might be higher among older respondents. Wave-by-wave 
analyses regressing the correlations on age indicated varying amounts of evidence for an increase in the 
waves 1 to 7 (bs ≈ 0.001, ps = .083, .007, .084, .026, .002, < .001, .017), but no noticeable trend in wave 8 
(p = .858). In a pooled analysis, the positive trend dominated with a significant increase of the strength of 
the association between self-assessed health and subjective well-being across age (b = .001, p < .001). 
Lack of symptoms (wave 7 only). As can be seen in Figure 1, Panel F, the association between 
the absence of symptoms that affect respondents gets stronger among older respondents, but this trend 
levels off at around age 50. The association with age was statistically significant (p < .001) and according 
to visual inspection could be described with a quadratic age trend to partly capture the flattening of the 






Figure 1: Smoothed associations between the respective correlates and subjective well-being over age in the 
European Social Survey. Shaded areas indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
Further Exploration of the Age Trends 
Next, to get a better understanding of the cross-sectional age trajectories in the correlations 
between the predictors and subjective well-being, we tested whether gender, as well as the three country-





we calculated the correlations for 2-year age groups between 18 and 80 and for each ESS wave, and this 
time, we performed the calculation separately for each country included in the respective wave and 
separately by gender. Notice that we first tried to calculate correlations separately for each year of age; 
however, this resulted in a large number (about 10%) of missing correlations because not every unique 
age-by-gender-by-country-by-data wave cell had enough observations to calculate correlations with 
standard errors. After always pooling two consecutive years (or three years for the very last age group, 78 
to 80), the number of missing correlations was reduced (1%). The age groups were coded as 18.5, 
20.5,…,78.5, so that the unit of the resulting coefficient still expresses changes in the correlation 
coefficient per year of age. This procedure resulted in one correlation coefficient per age group per gender 
per country per ESS wave. The results of the analyses of gender differences in the trajectories can be 
found in the supplement.  
In the analysis of country-level variables, we were interested in whether the cross-sectional age 
trajectories of the correlations systematically varied by country, and whether these differences could 
potentially be attributed to certain characteristics of the included countries. Note that at this point, we 
decided against further analyzing the two outcomes capturing health symptoms because we considered 
the data of only one wave too unreliable for country-wise analysis. 
Unsurprisingly, for all of the analyzed variables, allowing the age trajectories of the correlations 
with subjective well-being to vary by country significantly improved the models (p < .001). Figures 2 to 4 
visualize this heterogeneity by showing smoothed age trends for each of the analyzed countries. Given 
this evident variability, the question arises whether any of the between-country differences can be tied to 






Figure 2: Smoothed age trajectories of the associations between social life and subjective well-being for the 






Figure 3: Smoothed age trajectories of the associations between subjective well-being on the one side and household 






Figure 4: Smoothed age trajectories of the associations between self-assessed health and subjective well-being for 





Moderating Effects of Country Characteristics 
In separate analyses for each correlate of subjective well-being and for each of the extracted 
components characterizing the countries (wealth, fertility, health), we again first tested for main effects of 
the component on the correlation (e.g., is the overall correlation between subjective well-being and 
income higher or lower in wealthier countries?), and then for interactions with age (e.g., are age 
differences in the correlations between subjective well-being and income different in wealthier 
countries?). We used weighted regression analyses predicting the correlations from respondents’ age, 
factor variables presenting the wave of data collection, country, and gender; subsequently, we added the 
component describing country characteristics, and then the interaction between the component and age. 
For the income variables, we added the interactions between the country characteristic and both age and 
age^2. 
Social Life. There was some weak evidence for a main effect of the wealth component on both 
the association between social activities and subjective well-being (bwealth = -0.023, p = .037; Figure 5, 
Panel A) and on the association between social meetings and subjective well-being (bwealth = -0.018, p = 
.087; Figure 5, Panel B) with overall higher associations in less wealthy countries. Regarding the 
interaction with the age trend, the indicators showed somewhat different patterns with no pronounced 
interaction on the social activities variable (bage*wealth = -0.0001, p = .292) but a more pronounced age 
trend on the social meetings variables (bage*wealth = -0.0003, p = .001). 
Considering the fertility component, there was some very weak evidence that the association 
between social meetings and subjective well-being was overall higher in countries that scored lower on 
fertility (bfertility = -0.027, p = .041; Figure 5, Panel D), which did not replicate for the other social 
correlate, social activities (bfertility = -0.013, p = .315; Figure 5, Panel C). For both social variables, the age 
trend was not noticeably modulated by the fertility component (social activities: p = .536; social 
meetings: p = .861). 
The equality component affected the correlation between social activities and subjective well-
being in a very similar manner as did the wealth component for the association between social meetings 
and subjective well-being, with no remarkable overall effect (bequality = 0.098, p = .273; Figure 5, Panel E) 
but a significant interaction (bage*equality = -0.0004, p = .001), indicating that in less equal countries, the 
correlation between social activities and subjective well-being increased more strongly with age. In 
contrast, there was some evidence for a main effect of the equality component on the association between 
social meetings and subjective well-being (bequality = 0.019, p = .007; Figure 5, Panel F), but not 







Figure 5: Model-implied age trajectories of the associations between subjective well-being and indicators of social 






Income and income satisfaction. There was some weak evidence for a main effect of the wealth 
component on the overall level of the correlation between income and subjective well-being, with the 
correlation between income and well-being being lower in wealthier countries (bwealth = -0.019, p = .057; 
Figure 6, Panel A) and some indication that wealth modulated the cross-sectional age trajectory of the 
correlation (p = .017, compound test of the interaction with both the linear and the quadratic age effect)—
however, visual inspection suggests that the inverted-U shape of the trajectory is not strongly modified. 
For income satisfaction, there was even less indication for such a main effect for the association 
between income satisfaction and subjective well-being (bwealth = 0.015, p = .107; Figure 6, Panel B). 
Again, results suggested that wealth modulated the age trajectory (p < .001); the implied trajectories 
suggested that in wealthier countries, the mid-age peak of the association is more pronounced. 
In countries that scored low on the fertility component, the correlation between income and 
subjective well-being seemed to be overall stronger (bfertility = -0.044, p = .001; Figure 6, Panel C); there 
was no strong evidence for an interaction with age (p = .078) and the model-implied trajectories remained 
similar in shape. In contrast, income satisfaction did not show a comparable main effect (bfertility = 0.015, p 
= .107; Figure 6, Panel D) but there was some evidence that the fertility component modulated the cross-
sectional age trajectory of the correlation (p < .001). However, plotting the model-implied pattern 
revealed that the qualitative shapes of the trajectories remained relatively unchanged except for a steeper 
decline of the association among older respondents in countries with higher fertility. 
Regarding the equality component, it had had neither a main effect on the association between 
subjective well-being and actual income (bequality = -.0071, p = .295; Figure 6, Panel E), nor did it 
modulate the age pattern (p = .348); however, it did seem to affect the correlation between feelings about 
income and subjective well-being (bequality = -0.027, p < .001; Figure 6, Panel F), and it also seemed to 
affect the age trajectory (bage*equality = -0.0005, p < .001): in countries with lower equality, the association 
between income satisfaction and subjective well-being was generally higher and did not decrease as 






Figure 6: Model-implied age trajectories of the associations between subjective well-being and income/feelings 






Health. There was no evidence that wealth had an overall effect on the association between self-
reports of health and subjective well-being (bwealth = -0.003, p = .742; Figure 7, Panel A), but we found an 
interaction (bage*wealth = -0.0003, p < .001) of the same sign as for the social variables: the increase in the 
associations with respondents’ age was more pronounced in less wealthy countries. 
Analyses suggested a main effect of the fertility component on the correlation between health and 
subjective well-being: in countries that scored higher, the correlation was overall lower (bfertility = -0.031, p 
= .011; Figure 7, Panel B). At the same time, fertility did not seem to moderate the age increase of the 
correlation (bage*fertility = -0.000, p = .349). 
Lastly, the correlation between self-report of health and subjective well-being was not overall 
affected by the equality component (bequality = 0.005, p = .426; Figure 7, Panel C), but equality seemed to 
modulate the cross-sectional age trajectory so that the age increase of the correlation was more 
pronounced in countries with lower equality (bage*equality = -0.0005, p < .001). Hence, the observed pattern 
for the equality component was similar to the observed pattern for the wealth component. 
 
Figure 7: Model-implied age trajectories of the associations between subjective well-being and self-assessed health 






We examined the age patterns in three correlates of subjective well-being—social relations, 
income, and health—across 32 European countries. Results suggest that across countries social relations 
and health indicators are more strongly associated with subjective well-being among older respondents, 
whereas the association between income and subjective well-being follows an inverse U-shape with the 
highest associations among the middle aged. We detected considerable variation between countries and 
explored whether such patterns were systematically associated with country characteristics (e.g., GDP, 
unemployment, old-age dependency ratio, gender parity) but results suggest that these characteristics do 
not strongly moderate the age-related patterns. In what follows, we summarize and discuss in more detail 
the pattern of results. 
Concerning the association between social relations and subjective well-being, the two indicators 
tapping into respondents’ social lives—self-reports of the frequency of social activities, and self-reports 
of the frequency of meeting with others—we found that the strength of the association with subjective 
well-being increases among older respondents, matching past findings (Pinquart & Sörensen. 2000). The 
pattern regarding the influence of country characteristics was somewhat inconsistent, with positive 
increase with age in the association between social life and subjective well-being being more pronounced 
in less developed (i.e., less wealthy, less equal) countries. One explanation for this finding could be 
differences in social security systems and patterns of inter-generational support: older individuals in less 
wealthy countries might more often rely on assistance from relatives and other social contacts for function 
that are more often performed by the state market-based institutions in wealthier countries.  
The correlation between household income and subjective well-being followed a robust inverse 
U-shape, corroborating previous findings (e.g., Cheung & Lucas, 2015). The same pattern was observed 
for income satisfaction. This is interesting in itself because it contradicts one possible explanation for the 
decline of the correlation between income in subjective well-being in old age: the idea that, among older 
individuals, accumulated wealth might render income only a weak proxy of actual financial resources. 
However, income satisfaction captured respondents’ perceptions of how well they can cope, and these 
assessments likely take into account accumulated wealth, making this explanation less plausible. 
Regarding the role of country characteristics, we found some weak evidence that countries with higher 
wealth showed lower correlations between household income and subjective well-being, which is 
compatible with the idea of satiation (i.e., diminishing returns with increasing levels of wealth, see 
Diener, Lucas, & Oishi, 2018, for a summary of the literature on this issue). However, this moderation 
was not shown for income satisfaction: The perceived (in)ability to cope on the current income was 





found that the opposite pattern was the case for the equality component: Although it was not associated 
with correlations between income and subjective well-being, it was associated with lower correlations 
between income satisfaction and subjective well-being. One tentative interpretation of this pattern is that 
the role of the subjective assessments of one’s income is amplified in environments with overall higher 
inequality.  
Finally, we found that the association between self-assessed health and subjective well-being 
increases with respondents’ age. Likewise, we found increasing (negative) correlations between a variety 
of symptoms of impaired health and subjective well-being. The cross-sectional age trajectory of the 
correlation between health and subjective well-being seemed stronger in less wealthy and in less equal 
countries. This modulation might again suggest that social security systems could play a role because they 
might be able to buffer the burden of bad health on respondents’ lives in old age. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
We reported age differences in the associations between well-being and three of its main 
correlates and the results are compatible with motivational theories that posit developmental changes in 
the importance or relevance of specific goals or values to subjective well-being (Oishi et al., 1999). 
However, our results do not provide direct evidence concerning the involvement of specific motivational 
mechanisms leading to the age patterns found.  To actually investigate how the causal effects of various 
determinants of subjective well-being change across the life course, it would be necessary to go beyond 
correlations and properly identify the relevant causal effects. One potential avenue would be to leverage 
exogeneous variation, induced by either actual or natural experiments that act upon the hypothesized 
motivational mechanisms, but such manipulations remain elusive. 
Another major limitation of our work is that, as a cross-sectional investigation, all inferences to 
(within-subject) age changes are suggestive at best. This also implies one major alternative explanation 
for both the cross-sectional age trajectories and between-country differences: differences in historical 
experiences between cohorts. Although the present study aimed for breadth by looking at a broad range of 
countries and multiple correlates, future investigation could aim at more depth by zooming in on 
longitudinal trends in specific countries, and probing the plausibility of various mechanisms. To our 
knowledge, the study by Cheung and Lucas (2015) is the only study that makes use of longitudinal data to 
answer the question of how a specific correlate of well-being might change its role for well-being, and 
whether it does so through changes in individuals’ values. One natural step forward would be to use 
similar data and methods to test whether the cross-sectional patterns that we found for social relations and 






Our results suggest that the associations between subjective well-being and social life, income, 
and health are systematically different across the life span. As a result, “well-being” may have a shifting 
meaning across adulthood, with income mattering most in middle-age, while health and social relations 
being most important in old age. Future work investing these dynamics, including cross-country variation, 
might refine our understanding of how subjective well-being can be cultivated across the life span and 
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Easy as (Happiness) Pie? A Critical Evaluation of a Popular Model of the Determinants of Well-being 
 
Nicholas J. L. Brown & Julia M. Rohrer 
 
Abstract 
An underlying principle behind much of the research in positive psychology is that individuals have 
considerable leeway to increase their levels of happiness. In an influential article that is frequently cited in 
support of such claims, Lyubomirsky et al. put forward a model (subsequently popularized under the 
name of the “happiness pie”) in which approximately 50% of individual differences in happiness are due 
to genetic factors and 10% to life circumstances, leaving 40% available to be changed via volitional 
activities. We re-examined Lyubomirsky et al.’s claims and found several apparent deficiencies in their 
chain of arguments on both the empirical and the conceptual level. We conclude that there is little 
empirical evidence for the variance decomposition suggested by the “happiness pie,” and that even if it 
were valid, it is not necessarily informative with respect to the question of whether individuals can truly 
exert substantial influence over their own chronic happiness level. We believe that our critical re-
examination of Lyubomirsky et al.’s seminal article offers insights into some common misconceptions 
and pitfalls of scientific inference, and we hope that it might contribute to the construction of a more 
rigorous and solid empirical basis for the field of positive psychology. 
The final version of this article which underwent further copyediting & typesetting has been published in 








Easy as (Happiness) Pie? A Critical Evaluation of a Popular Model of the Determinants of Well-being 
 
One of the key claims of the positive psychology movement is that most individuals are able to 
exercise substantial control over their own levels of happiness2. On this account, people can become 
durably happier—in Seligman’s (2002, p. ix) words, “go from plus two to plus seven” in their lives—by 
adopting a variety of strategies, such as expressing gratitude (Emmons & McCullough, 2003), applying 
one’s character strengths in novel ways (Seligman, Steen, Park, & Peterson, 2005), writing about positive 
experiences (Burton & King, 2004), or practicing loving-kindness meditation (Fredrickson, 2013). Over 
the past two decades or so, these ideas have been widely publicized both within scholarly circles and in 
the popular media (e.g., Scelpo, 2017). 
Arguably the most popular model of the factors influencing well-being, and hence people’s ability 
to improve their own happiness, is the one presented by Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade (2005) that 
has become widely known as the “happiness pie.” This model, reproduced here as Figure 1, purports to 
show the percentage of variance in well-being that is explained by each of three sources of variation 
(which Lyubomirsky et al. referred to as “factors”): genetic predisposition (which was labeled the 
“happiness set point” by Lyubomirsky et al.; see also Lykken, 1999; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996), life 
circumstances, and volitional (intentional) activities. It should be noted that this model attempts to explain 
“chronic happiness levels,” that is, an experience that is more enduring than momentary fluctuations in 
well-being and can be captured by retrospective summary judgments or by averaging momentary 
judgments over a period of months. Lyubomirsky et al. claimed that up to 40% of the variance in well-
being levels according to this definition was explained by volitional activities, suggesting further that 
intentional activity was “arguably [the] most promising means of altering one’s happiness level” (p. 118). 
According to Lyubomirsky et al., 50% of the variance in well-being is explained by genetic factors and 
just 10% by “life circumstances,” a term whose meaning and scope we explore in some depth in the 
present article. 
                                               
2 For simplicity, throughout the present article, we assume that the terms “happiness” and “[subjective] well-being” 
represent the same construct, which can to some extent be captured by “life satisfaction.” Treating these terms as 
(sometimes) interchangeable appears to be a common practice in the positive psychology literature, as shown by 
chapter titles such as “Happiness: Also known as ‘life satisfaction’ and ‘subjective well-being’” (Veenhoven, 2011). 
A discussion of the extent to which these constructs might in fact differ and how they are related is beyond the scope 







Figure 1. The “Happiness Pie” (after Lyubomirsky et al., 2005, p. 116). Original caption: “Three primary factors 
influencing the chronic happiness level.” 
Since the publication of Lyubomirsky et al.’s (2005) article, which according to Google Scholar 
had 2,991 citations as of January 8, 2019, the “happiness pie”—including the relative proportions of its 
components, and especially the claim that intentional activity is a far more important determinant of well-
being than life circumstances—has become a key element of the discourse surrounding well-being. In the 
academic sphere, this model has been cited by scholars working not only on topics that might be 
considered as the traditional domain of positive psychology, such as employee well-being (Page & Vella-
Brodrick, 2009), the relation between pleasure and engagement (Schueller & Seligman, 2010), or 
interventions to enhance happiness in normal populations (Proyer, Ruch, & Buschor, 2013), but also in 
research areas as diverse as psychotherapy (Rashid, 2008), aging (Butler & Ciarrochi, 2007), consumer 
behavior (Hudders & Pandelaere, 2012), negative emotions (Jordan et al., 2011), self-care for 
psychologists (Wise, Hersh, & Gibson, 2012), heart disease (Huffman et al., 2011), tourism (Nawijn & 
Mitas, 2012), and intellectual disability (Dykens, 2006). In wider society, the happiness pie has been a 
prominent element in the popularization of positive psychology, especially in the areas of happiness-





development” products and services that have sprung up on the periphery of this new subfield. For 
example, a large cherry pie cut into two parts (60%–40%) features prominently on the front of the 
hardcover edition of Lyubomirsky’s (2007) book The How of Happiness: A Scientific Approach to 
Getting the Life You Want, and the same image was used by a training company to promote a “Positive 
Psychology Master Class” with the same author (MentorCoach, 2008). The 40% figure has been widely 
touted as an empirical fact, as an Internet search for the terms “happiness” and “40%” will quickly reveal. 
As the New York-based British writer Ruth Whippman put it: 
This 40 per cent figure is much quoted in the positive-psychology literature in both 
academic and popular texts, and represents the field’s great marketing opportunity. This is the 40 
per cent that anyone with a book to sell, a course of coaching to offer or a happiness technique to 
promote is hoping to co-opt. (Whippman, 2016, p. 195) 
Although some researchers have written brief critiques of the “happiness pie” in blog posts (e.g., 
Bergink, 2015; Kashdan, 2015; Krueger, 2015), it seems that until now no prominent peer-reviewed 
articles have been published in the formal psychological literature that discuss the origins and validity of 
Lyubomirsky et al.’s model. Such an exploration is the focus of the present article. First, we consider 
some conceptual issues that arise when using population-level variance decomposition to make claims 
about individual-level potential for change. Second, we discuss weaknesses of the “happiness equation” 
that is implied by the “happiness pie” and Lyubomirsky et al.’s claim that up to 40% of the variance in 
happiness can be attributed to volitional activities. Third, we re-examine the numerical estimates that 
Lyubomirsky et al. assigned to the genetic set point and circumstances. We conclude with a summary of 
our findings and some recommendations for future research directions. 
Between-Subjects Variance Decomposition Versus Individual-Level Potential for Change 
Lyubomirsky et al.’s (2005) examination of the determinants of chronic happiness levels draws 
on the well-known logic of variance decomposition. For example, psychologists frequently report how the 
percentage of variance of a certain outcome that can be explained by a set of predictors (typically using 
the coefficient of determination, R²), or the percentage of variance that a new construct can explain over 
and above established measures (incremental R²). However, such a variance decomposition can only be 
interpreted in terms of variation within a certain population (e.g., “10% of the between-subject variance in 
happiness can be explained by life circumstances”), and cannot be translated into individual-level 





circumstances”), unless it was explicitly established on the within-subject level (which, as we will see 
later, is not the case for the studies underlying Lyubomirsky et al.’s model). 
Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) seem to have been aware of this distinction, as they pointed out that 
previous research has been dominated by cross-sectional, between-subjects studies (p. 112). However, 
these authors’ language was not always consistent throughout their article; for example, they wrote that 
their derivation of the 50:10:40 ratio “implies that one’s [emphasis added] chronic happiness during a 
particular life period can be increased” (p. 117), which could be taken to suggest that each individual 
necessarily has a substantial margin within which to improve their well-being. In line with this 
interpretation, popular self-help books and web sites often use the 50:10:40 ratio as evidence that (all) 
individuals can choose to affect their own well-being substantially. The 40% of a person’s happiness that, 
on this account, can be changed (implicitly for the better) by one’s own choices is typically described 
using phrases such as “providing an excellent opportunity to increase our level of happiness” (Cygan, 
2013, p. 22) or “a substantial amount of control to have over one’s own well-being” (Vondruska, 2017, 
p. 11), demonstrating that regardless of what Lyubomirsky et al.’s intended interpretation may have been, 
many writers have decided to go with the within-subject version. (Later in this article, we discuss these 
issues in more detail for the benefit of researchers who are interested in investigating well-being at the 
level of individual subjects.) 
Furthermore, even if the numbers used to partition the happiness pie held on the within-subject 
level, they would still not necessarily imply anything about the potential of possible volitional activities 
or interventions, for two reasons. First, the variance that can be explained by certain factors will 
necessarily be constrained by the variability of these factors in the population. For example, imagine that 
a highly effective method was found that allowed individuals to intentionally raise their chronic happiness 
levels by multiple points. If this method gained some popularity—say, being adapted by half of the 
population—then it would, by definition, increase the amount of variance in chronic happiness levels 
attributable to volitional activities. However, if almost everybody in the population adapted the method, it 
would no longer explain much variance in chronic happiness levels, because it would have consistently 
raised the level of the whole population. Hence, the variance attributable to this hypothetical intervention 
would change, even if its potential to increase an individual’s well-being remained constant. Second, 
there is no evidence for the proposition that the activities that individuals choose to undertake can actually 
explain all of the “missing” 40% of the variance in their well-being; this leads us to another major issue 






Does the “Happiness Pie” Add Up? 
Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) based their pie chart on the idea that, if 50% of variance in well-being 
is explained by genetic factors and 10% by circumstances, this “leaves as much as 40% of the variance 
for intentional activity” (p. 116). While these authors’ arithmetic cannot be faulted, it is not clear that the 
rest of their reasoning is as impeccable. The variance decomposition suggested by Lyubomirsky et al. 
implies an underlying “happiness equation”, which bears a resemblance to the formula for multiple linear 
regression: 
H = β1S + β2C + β3V    (1) 
where H is happiness (or well-being), S (“set point”) is the genetic component3, C is 
circumstances, and V is volitional activities. However, equation (1) suffers from several defects, which we 
investigate in the following sections. 
Genes, circumstances, and volitional activities are not independent additive factors 
The conceptualization of the happiness pie and its underlying variance decomposition is only 
correct when all three factors are independent (i.e., they do not interact and do not covary). As Krueger 
(2015) has pointed out, this assumption is unlikely to hold. As an example of an interaction, lower well-
being due to anxiety might be the result of the interaction of childhood stress with a genetic predisposition 
(cf. Swann & Seyle, 2005). 
Considering covariation between the factors influencing happiness, the simple additive model 
ignores the possibility that the effects of genes on happiness might be largely mediated by circumstantial 
factors and volitional activities (e.g., Lykken, 1999, p. 81). Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) acknowledged that 
genes influence happiness indirectly through experiences and environments, but they seemed to interpret 
this only in terms of mitigation of negative genetic influences, as in the claim that “unwanted effects of 
genes could be minimized by active efforts” (p. 114). It seems equally plausible, however, that positive 
genetic influences on happiness might be mediated through behaviors that could be classified as volitional 
activities. For example, Lyubomirsky et al. mentioned exercising regularly and striving for important 
personal goals as volitional activities, but both the inclination to perform daily physical activity and the 
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tendency to persevere in one’s efforts seem to be partly heritable (Moore-Harrison & Lightfoot, 2010; 
Rimfeld, Kovas, Dale, & Plomin, 2016). This is neither particularly surprising (cf. Turkheimer, 2000), 
nor does it constitute support for genetic determinism, but merely demonstrates that the simple 
breakdown of the three factors into proportions that sum to 100% is unjustified from an empirical point of 
view. 
Furthermore, the distinction between the slices of the happiness pie might reify common 
misunderstandings regarding the nature of heritability estimates. While it seems popular to assume that 
high heritability implies low malleability, this is not the case: A trait can be both highly heritable and 
malleable at the same time. For example, the heritability of general intelligence is high, but education 
reliably increases intelligence (Plomin & Deary, 2015; Ritchie & Tucker-Drob, 2018). 
Lack of an error term 
To the extent that equation (1) corresponds to a multiple regression formula, an element that is 
obviously missing is an error term. Given the vicissitudes of human subjects, it seems rather optimistic to 
expect that this would ever be zero4, even if someone were to actually conduct a single study to examine 
the relative contributions of genetic factors, circumstances, and volitional activities to chronic levels of 
well-being. At the very least, measurement error in H would need to be considered5. For example, if one 
measured H with a reliability of .80, the three factors S, C, and V would add up to 80% at best—the 
remaining 20% of variance in happiness would be attributable to measurement error and thus unable to be 
explained. Assuming the additive model held true, and assuming the estimates for 50% and 10% were 
true, this would immediately decrease the amount of variance potentially attributable to volitional 
activities to 80% − 50% − 10% = 20%. 
It is, of course, possible that Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) conceptualized their formula as a thought 
experiment (cf. Werner, 2018) on the latent variable level (or that they were thinking about estimates of 
chronic happiness that were averaged over many measurement occasions, thus reducing the measurement 
error), so that one could assume that the 100% of the “pie” refers to the reliable variance in chronic 
happiness levels. However, in such a case, the estimates for S and C would need to be based on models 
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a deterministic manner—a very strong claim, to which most psychologists probably would not want to subscribe. 
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 If the outcome measures are different in each case (e.g., “happiness” and “well-being”), then to the extent that 
these constructs do not overlap (cf. footnote 2), a certain amount of variance due to the difference in these constructs 





that take into account measurement error (which was not the case for the studies from which the estimates 
were drawn). Holding everything else equal, using such models would revise estimates of the respective 
percentages for the impact of genes and life circumstances upwards, since measurement error attenuates 
observed associations and heritability estimates (see Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999, for a 
demonstration of this phenomenon). Consequently, the “leftover” variance attributable to volitional 
activities would need to be revised downwards once again. 
Potentially omitted determinants of happiness 
Lyubomirsky et al.’s (2005) argument regarding the potential of volitional activities to influence 
levels of happiness assumes that genetic factors, circumstances, and volitional activities are the only three 
possible causes of variance in well-being. This depends on the use of “circumstances” as a catch-all term 
to include all of the vicissitudes of life that are outside of one’s personal control and that “happen to 
people” (p. 118; emphasis in original). Thus, assuming this definition, factors like in utero development 
effects would need to be considered in the estimate for C. Because a multitude of such factors has likely 
been omitted due to the nature of the surveys on which the estimate is based, this estimate would almost 
certainly need to be revised upwards. Again, under the assumption that the subtraction logic of the 
“happiness pie” is valid, this would thus lead to a smaller estimate of V. Note that Lyubomirsky et al. did 
not explicitly claim that their choice of three factors (S, C, and V) was exhaustive; however, once S and C 
have been defined, the third section of the pie chart (V) ought logically to be labeled “anything that is not 
circumstances and set point, including volitional activities.” Of course, this would result in a much less 
convincing thought experiment, as it does not allow us to infer how promising volitional activities, on 
their own, potentially are. 
Adding up percentages of variance explained from different studies is questionable 
Lyubomirsky et al.’s (2005) drew their estimates of the variance explained by genetic factors and 
life circumstances from different sources, who studied samples drawn from different populations. It 
seems questionable that these estimates can simply be combined and then subtracted from 100% to derive 
an estimate of the influence of something that has not been measured. The percentage of variance that can 
be explained by any single construct, or set of constructs, is always specific to a certain population. Thus, 








Re-examining the Numerical Estimates of the Effect of Genes and Circumstances 
How much variance in chronic happiness levels can be explained by genetic factors? 
It appears that Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) derived their figure of 50% for the heritability of well-
being by combining, in a way that was not clearly specified, the results from three studies (Braungart, 
Plomin, DeFries, & Fulker, 1992; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Tellegen et al., 1988). Lykken and Tellegen 
estimated that “the heritability of the stable component of subjective well-being approaches 80%” 
(p. 186). Tellegen et al. examined general personality traits in adult twins and determined that heritability 
ranged from 39% to 58% with an estimate of 48% for the personality trait labeled “Well-Being”. In 
contrast, Braungart et al. measured the influence of genetic factors on externally-reported developmental 
and emotional behaviors in children aged 1 or 2 and found heritability ranging from 35% to 57%. Even 
taking the lower bound of the estimated range of heritability from this study (which did not measure adult 
well-being), we arrive at an average figure of around 61%, whether or not the studies are weighted to take 
into account their sample sizes. About the best that can be said, then, for the figure of 50% for genetic 
factors is that it is surrounded by considerable uncertainty, and appears—based on the studies cited by 
Lyubomirsky et al.—likely to be a lower bound. Of course, any upward adjustment of this number would 
necessarily imply a downward adjustment of the percentage of variance attributable to volitional 
activities, if we accept the subtraction logic suggested by Lyubomirsky et al. Note that current overviews 
of the literature locate the heritability of overall (i.e., including momentary) happiness at 32–41%, but for 
the stable component of happiness (i.e., the chronic levels that are the outcome of interest in Lyubomirsky 
et al.’s model) heritability is reported in the 70–80% range (Nes & Røysamb, 2017). 
Origins of the claim that only 10% of the variance in well-being is due to life circumstances 
Lyubomirsky (2007, p. 41) claimed that the figure of 10% for the amount of variance in happiness 
explained by life circumstances “represents an average from many past investigations, which reveal that 
all life circumstances and situations put together account for only about 10 percent in how happy different 
people are.” Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) cited two sources in support of the 10% claim: a book chapter by 
Argyle (1999) and an article by Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith (1999). Argyle in fact gave two figures on 
his pp. 353–354: “less than 10 percent of the variance,” which he attributed to Andrews and Withey 
(1976), and 15%, which he reported as having been proposed by Diener (1984). The first of these figures 
appears to correspond to the following quote from Andrews and Withey (1976, p. 109): “The 
demographic variables, either singly or jointly, account for very little of the variance in perceptions of 
global well-being (less than 10 percent)”, while the second appears to refer to this: “individual 





together probably do not account for much more than 15% of the variance” (Diener, 1984, p. 558). Notice 
that both of these quotes refer to demographic variables, which, crucially, are not the same as life 
circumstances, as we discuss below. 
In the second article cited by Lyubomirsky et al. (2005), Diener et al. (1999, pp. 278–279) 
reported three candidate percentages for the variance in happiness explained by circumstances: 20% 
according to Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976), 8% according to Andrews and Withey (1976), and 
the same 15% mentioned by Argyle that was cited separately by Lyubomirsky et al. (which was, of 
course, Diener’s original informal estimate from 1984). Later in their article, Lyubomirsky et al. stated 
that “all circumstances combined account for only 8% to 15% of the variance in happiness levels” 
(p. 117), again with citations of Argyle (1999) and Diener et al. (1999); for some reason they omitted to 
mention the figure of 20%, derived from Campbell et al.’s study, which Diener et al. had cited in the 
sentence immediately preceding their discussion of the 8% and 15% figures. Lyubomirsky et al. did not 
report how they finally settled on their “headline” figure of 10%, but we tentatively assume that this was 
derived by some sort of informal interpolation between 8% and 15%. In summary, it seems that there is a 
considerable lack of clarity about how the (subsequently highly influential) figure of 10% was arrived at. 
Hence, we turned to the original sources to look for this information. 
First, we examined Andrews and Withey’s (1976) book, which describes the results of a large, 
multiple-occasion study involving an overall total of 5,142 US Americans. Of interest here are the 
surveys that were conducted in May 1972 (N = 1,297), and April 1973 (N = 1,433), which were the ones 
used by Andrews and Withey (1976, pp. 138–142) to illustrate their discussion of the limited value of 
“classification variables” in predicting overall life satisfaction. We found two tables (Exhibit 4.6 on 
p. 139 and Exhibit 4.7 on p. 141) showing that the percentage of variance explained by “six classification 
variables” was 8% in the May 1972 survey and 11% in the April 1973 survey. These “classification 
variables” are age, family income, education, race, sex, and “family life-cycle stage”, with the last of 
these being a categorical variable based on “the respondent’s own age and marital status, and the age of 
the youngest child living in the family” (Andrews & Withey, 1976, p. 138). These variables, which 
Andrews and Withey (1976, p. 138) described as “demographic or social characteristics,” were used 
mainly as the basis of classifying their subjects into subgroups; it is clear, using Lyubomirsky et al.’s 
(2005) own definition (which we discuss below), that they do not constitute an exhaustive inventory of 
“life circumstances,” sufficient to allow conclusions to be drawn about the effect of such circumstances 
on an individual’s well-being. 
Turning to Campbell et al.’s (1976) book, which was based on a survey of 2,147 US Americans 





explored the relation between satisfaction with an individual domain of life (e.g., “housing” or “life in the 
United States”) on the one hand, and participants’ subjective assessments of that domain and their 
“personal characteristics” on the other. The percentage of variance explained by the combination of 
subjective assessments and personal characteristics in these tables is typically in the range of 20–30%, 
with personal characteristics typically accounting for around 8–10%, but—as with Andrews and Withey’s 
(1976) “classification variables”—the lists of these characteristics were short (five or six items), with race 
and (where present) age and sex typically having the largest partial correlations with the relevant 
satisfaction measure. Indeed, Diener et al. made it clear that their estimates of the variance explained in 
these two books were based on “demographic factors,” not an extensive inventory of life circumstances: 
Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) found that demographic factors (e.g., age, sex, 
income, race, education, and marital status) accounted for less than 20% of the variance in SWB. 
Andrews and Withey (1976) could only account for 8% by using these variables. (Diener et al., 
1999, pp. 278–279) 
In summary, although it is not clear exactly how Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) arrived at their 
estimate that only 10% of variance in well-being is explained by life circumstances, the available 
evidence suggests that this well-publicized figure may have been derived from an erroneous conflation of 
“classification variables” or “demographic factors” with the much wider category of “life circumstances,” 
in a few tables of results in two books describing studies that were conducted by researchers at the same 
institution6 (the Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan) in the early 1970s. Whether or not 
this constitutes “many past investigations,” as claimed by Lyubomirsky (2007) in the sentence quoted at 
the start of this section, is perhaps a matter of opinion. However, given that these sources provided the 
empirical evidence that was ultimately used by Lyubomirsky et al. to support their claims about the effect 
of life circumstances on well-being, it would seem interesting to examine the evidence provided by these 
studies, while not losing sight of the limitations just mentioned. We were able to obtain the data sets on 
which Andrews and Withey (1976) and Campbell et al. (1976) based their books, and reanalyze them to 
see what percentage of variance in these authors’ respective life satisfaction outcomes was explained by a 
set of 15 to 18 variables (depending on the exact questions asked in each survey) that were agreed by 
external evaluators to correspond to “life circumstances.” With the same statistical techniques that had 
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 Indeed, Andrews and Withey’s (1976) book refers to the studies conducted by their colleagues Campbell et al. 
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been used by the original authors to arrive at the figure of 8–10% for demographic variables, we obtained 
values of between 18.13% and 26.47% for life circumstances. (A more modern approach using cross-
validation results in a wide range of estimates, between 1.92% and 17.90%, highlighting how such 
estimates depend both on the statistical methods employed and on the variables available in the datasets.) 
Further details are provided in the Supplementary Information of the present article. 
Measures of well-being are specific to given populations and periods of time 
Even if one were to assume that the variance decomposition suggested by Lyubomirsky et al. 
(2005) was valid (which we questioned above), it is not clear that these numbers still hold today (or, 
indeed, whether they did so when Lyubomirsky et al.’s article was published). Campbell et al. (1976) 
collected their data in 1971, while Andrews and Withey (1976) collected theirs in 1972–1973. This was a 
time when baby boomers were reaching adulthood and the Vietnam War was at its height. The relevance 
of these studies to the modern social landscape probably cannot be taken for granted. For example, the 
participants were between 87% and 90% White, with the rest being mostly reported as Black and no more 
than about 1% described as being of another race, while the demographic questions make it clear that the 
default expectation of the researchers was that cohabiting adults would be heterosexual and probably 
married. It is not clear whether the same results would be found were these studies to be repeated today, 
after forty years of social change in the United States and with considerably greater diversity in the 
population and people’s lifestyles. Any estimate of the percentage of variance that can be explained by a 
certain combination of predictors is only meaningful with respects to the population from which the 
sample has been drawn. Of course, in the period spanning almost half a century since these studies were 
conducted, other researchers have collected data that show the relation between demographic variables 
and well-being (see Diener, Lucas, & Oishi, 2018, for a review), but as we have already noted, such 
relations tell us little about the influence of variables that fall under the much wider category of life 
circumstances. 
A further caveat to note here is that when estimating the amount of variance in an outcome that 
can be attributed to certain predictors, analyses are necessarily constrained by the amount of variability in 
those predictors (as already explained for the case of volitional activities above). For example, broader 
economic circumstances are often constant within a survey at a given time point in a given sample. 
However, changes in these circumstances can have remarkable effects on well-being, as indicated by the 
World Happiness Report (United Nations, 2015), which is based on the Gallup World Poll. This report 
periodically measures the self-reported well-being of the inhabitants of most of the countries of the world 
on a “ladder” from 0 to 10 (Cantril, 1965). The 2015 report showed that between the measurement 





that represents almost one and a half steps down the ladder from the best possible life towards the worst. 
This reduction of 1.470 points also corresponds to 31.0% of the range of country-average well-being 
scores in the 2015 report from the highest (Switzerland, at 7.587) to the lowest (Togo, at 2.839). It seems 
unlikely that more than a trivial part of this decline in well-being over the better part of a decade can be 
accounted for by a change in the genetic characteristics of the population of Greece, or a decision by 
Greek citizens to eschew en masse the forms of intentional activity that might contribute to their 
individual happiness. Rather, the drastic change in their (economic) circumstances forced on the majority 
of Greeks by the ongoing financial crisis affecting their country would seem to be by far the most 
plausible candidate to explain this drop in national well-being (cf. Rhodes Hatzimalonas, 2017). Of 
course, one could argue that these changes are in some sense transitory, and ought to fade over the course 
of the years as the Greek economy recovers. However, if such a multi-year criterion is to be used to 
distinguish between mere fluctuations in circumstance and true changes to people’s chronic level of well-
being, it should logically also be applied to intervention studies claiming to produce sustainable changes 
in happiness. 
The wide range of scores between the top and bottom countries on the World Happiness Report 
list is another indication that there might be many circumstantial factors that affect well-being beyond 
those that were (or, indeed, could have been) included by Andrews and Withey (1976) and Campbell et 
al. (1976) in their surveys of US Americans. On a continuum from the smaller democracies of northern 
Europe at one end through to the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa at the other, there are 
considerable variations in political freedom or repression, institutional transparency or corruption, and the 
availability or lack of basic services such as electricity and clean drinking water, to name just a few 
examples of factors that might be expected to influence well-being, but would not be expected to vary 
much among any sample drawn from just one country. Indeed, Lyubomirsky et al. (2005, p. 117) 
acknowledged that “Happiness-relevant circumstances may include the national, geographical, and 
cultural region in which a person resides,” but these authors then failed to limit their own claims to the 
specific population from which the data were drawn (i.e., US Americans from the 1970s). We suggest that 
future research into the effects of life circumstances on well-being should take into account potential 
cross-cultural concerns and acknowledges the limitations of the samples being studied. For example, it 
has recently been suggested that researchers should explicitly limit conclusions to specific target 
populations to avoid unjustified generalizations (Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, 2017). 
Likewise, researchers should carefully reconsider the usage of terms such as “volitional 
activities”. What might be a matter of choice for some people can be a question of circumstances for 





wide range of choice over the diet that they and their children consume; they can choose to drive their car 
to the farmer’s market instead of taking the bus to the discount grocery store, and afford to place organic 
blueberries rather than canned, syrup-laden fruit cocktail in their shopping cart. They can also enjoy a 
wide range of recreational activities, such as vacations to awe-inspiring or culturally important 
destinations, enabling them to enjoy the benefits of feeling that they are part of a meaningful world 
(Gilovich & Kumar, 2015). Indeed, Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) themselves described the types of 
volitional activities that they were considering in decidedly middle-class terms: “rather than running on a 
track, a fitness-seeking wilderness lover might instead choose to run on a trail through the woods . . . 
rather than learning classical pieces, a jazz-loving piano student might instead choose to work on jazz 
standards” (p. 122). A subsistence farmer working from dawn to dusk in a developing nation, a worker 
who spends 14 hours per day assembling electronic devices in a south-east Asian factory, or a single 
Western parent living in less fortunate circumstances than the family just mentioned, may not be in a 
position to make such choices. As with many phenomena studied by primarily Western psychologists (cf. 
Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), the list of volitional activities that are available to improve one’s 
well-being may be less than universal, not just for cultural reasons but also precisely because of one’s life 
circumstances. 
Moving Forward: Between-Subjects Versus Within-Subject Designs and Causal Inference 
We noted earlier that there appeared to be a mismatch between the evidence (such as it was) 
provided by Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) for their model of variance decomposition—based on between-
subjects studies—and the suggestion that individuals can improve their happiness with volitional 
activities, which is inherently a within-subject effect. Such limitations of positive psychology research 
have been noted numerous times in the past (e.g., Lazarus, 2003; Nickerson, 2007, 2014), and calls for 
more longitudinal, within-subject research are not uncommon even in the discussion sections of studies 
based on cross-sectional, between-subjects data. In fact, it appears—at least from an informal 
examination—that within-subject designs may be becoming more popular within positive psychology. In 
early December 2018, we examined the 50 most recently published articles in the Journal of Happiness 
Studies that reported empirical data, and compared these with a random selection of 50 articles published 
in the same journal approximately ten years earlier. Whereas in 2007–2008 only seven out of 50 articles 
used within-subjects designs, by 2017–2018 this number had risen to 167, with a variety of methods being 
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used. For example, on a shorter timescale, data collected with the Experience Sampling Method 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Hunter, 2003) were used to investigate how detachment from workplace stresses 
affect the quality of interactions in romantic relationships (Debrot, Siegler, Klumb, & Schoebi, 2018), 
while on a longer timescale, data collected as part of a panel study of 1,500 households in Nepal were 
used to investigate the cost of coping on different forms of well-being (Chindarkar, Chen, & Gurung, 
2018). 
Part of the appeal of within-subject designs is that they can, if properly analyzed, control stable 
inter-individual differences, rendering a causal interpretation of associations more plausible (although 
such designs do not automatically warrant causal conclusions, as time-varying confounders can offer 
alternative explanations). Causal inference might not always be the explicitly stated goal of empirical 
investigations of subjective well-being, but it often seems to be what authors are most interested in; 
indeed, Lyubomirsky et al. (2015, p. 116) referred to the genetic set point, life circumstances, and 
intentional activity as the “three primary types of factors that we believe causally [emphasis added] affect 
the chronic happiness level.” For example, if there is a between-subjects association between a certain 
activity and happiness (i.e., on average, people who do X are happier), but no within-subject association 
(i.e., a person who starts doing X does not become happier), we would be quick to dismiss the between-
subjects association as spurious and refrain from advising people to do more X to become happier. 
However, this advantage becomes a complication when the aim is to give a holistic picture of all 
of the determinants that explain happiness (whether this is measured over an extended period of time or as 
short-term fluctuations). Many inter-individual differences, such as personality or socio-economic status, 
hardly vary within individuals, making it difficult to establish any within-subject association with the 
outcome. Even research on fairly common life events such as marriage or childbirth makes use of the 
massive sample sizes of ongoing panel studies to ensure that sufficient individuals have actually 
experienced the event in question while they were part of the study. 
Of course, the above comments merely underscore the self-evident truth that no single type of 
research design can answer all questions. Within-subject designs may pave the way for interesting new 
research questions with a different scope, such as whether individuals reliably differ in the volatility of 
their well-being, or in their reactivity to stressors, and which factors shape these inter-individual 
differences in intra-individual variation. However, the complex nature of human experience is such that 
data collected over a range of timescales, from a few minutes to many decades, will likely be needed to 
fully identify the determinants of well-being as individuals experience daily existence, major life 
milestones, and the general aging process (as well as any psychological interventions that we might 





working on subjective well-being considered more explicitly whether they are trying to draw causal 
conclusions (the answer might be “yes” more often than not), and, if so, made use of systematic and 
established approaches from other fields of research. For example, counterfactuals (e.g., Morgan & 
Winship, 2015; Neyman, 1923/1990), directed acyclic graphs (e.g., Kuipers, Moffa, Kuipers, Freeman, & 
Bebbington, 2018; Pearl, 2000), and various types of natural experiments (e.g., Dunning, 2008; Rutter, 
2007), might have been under-utilized in psychological well-being research (likely because they are not 
routinely taught to psychologists). A more careful consideration of the admittedly complex issue of 
causality might lead to the sobering conclusion that a complete decomposition of happiness into genes, 
circumstances, and intentional activities is not only an elusive research goal, but not even a well-defined 
one. 
Conclusion 
Since the publication of Lyubomirsky et al.’s (2005) model, research on subjective well-being has 
progressed considerably, as documented extensively by Diener et al. (2018). However, the “happiness 
pie” is still widely cited, and many of the problematic arguments underlying its claims—for example, 
misconceptions about the generalizability of between-subjects variance decompositions and about the 
interpretation of heritability estimates—can be found in contemporary research endeavors, both within 
and outside of positive psychology. Our somewhat lengthy search—documented earlier in the present 
article—to track down the claim that only 10% of the variance in happiness is due to life circumstances is 
a good example of the need, when integrating previous findings, to pay close attention to the details of the 
empirical studies to ensure that the summarized literature does in fact support the claim being made. 
As we have shown in this article, there is a considerable list of issues with the popular “happiness 
pie” decomposition of variance in well-being. First, a variance decomposition in the population does not 
necessarily inform us about the potential for individual level changes, although such conclusions are 
frequently drawn, and not just by statistically uninformed writers in the popular media. Second, the 
decomposition of the variance in chronic levels of happiness into three factors suffers from a major 
conceptual issue (the three factors are not additively affecting well-being in isolation) and certain 
omissions (error term, other potential determinants) that bias the analysis towards assigning higher 
percentages to volitional activities. Third, the estimates assigned to life circumstances and genetic factors 
are questionable. The empirical evidence cited indirectly by Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) in support of the 
idea that individuals’ life circumstances account for only 10% of the variance in well-being seems to be 
based on a misunderstanding of what the relevant studies actually investigated (many factors describing 
people’s life circumstances, versus the narrower category of demographic variables). Likewise, there is 





Consequently, there is little reason to believe that 40% is a reliable estimate of the variance in chronic 
happiness attributable to intentional activity—for example, if Lyubomirsky et al. had chosen a different 
(but, in our view, at least equally plausible) set of estimates, they might just as easily have concluded that 
as little as (100% − 80% − 15% = 5%) of variance in chronic happiness can be attributed to volitional 
activities. Of course, because of the conceptual issues that we have discussed, we do not believe that such 
an estimate would necessarily be more reasonable or more interpretable. 
Although our analyses in the present article have been focused on the “happiness pie,” we feel 
that is useful to point out that the issues we have addressed—namely, misconceptions about the 
interpretation of between-subjects variance decomposition; misconstruction of genes, environment, and 
volition as orthogonal factors; and misreading or misinterpretation of the findings from previous 
studies—are certainly not limited to the study by Lyubomirsky et al. (2005). In fact, such issues seem to 
recur throughout many research fields in psychology. However, the influence on the popular imagination 
of the “happiness pie” model particularly underscores the need for psychologists to be circumspect in 
their claims, including when they venture beyond academic writing into popular books and other ways of 
disseminating their work to a broader public. While this form of outreach ought to be an admirable 
development, it comes with the responsibility to avoid making claims beyond what the evidence allows 
for. 
Several writers (e.g., Di Martino, Eiroa-Orosa, & Arcidiacono, 2017; Ehrenreich, 2009; 
Whippman, 2016) have criticized positive psychology for placing too much emphasis on the purported 
ability of individuals to improve their psychological well-being regardless of the social conditions under 
which they live. The idea that only 10% of one’s happiness is due to circumstances, with four times as 
much “capacity” being available to people to forge their own well-being, is attractive and fits into a 
pervasive contemporary “feel-good” narrative in which self-improvement is claimed to be not only 
desirable, but also eminently achievable (see Moreau, Macnamara, & Hambrick, 2019, for a discussion of 
several other current topics of psychological research where claims about the malleability of traits appear 
to have been overstated). At this point we take no particular view of the political questions that might be 
implicitly raised by such claims; our principal interest is to point out some ways in which they might not 
be justified by the available evidence. Indeed, it seems to us to be vital at this point for positive 
psychologists to critically re-examine the evidence base for their claims about the ability of people to 
improve their own happiness. We hope that our discussion of the conceptual limitations of Lyubomirsky 
et al.’s (2005) model may generate helpful insights for future research programs to ensure a solid 
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Re-examination of the 10% claim 
It turns out that, beyond the simple demographic variables such as age and ethnicity that seem to 
form the basis of the numbers calculated by Diener and colleagues that were cited by Lyubomirsky, 
Sheldon, and Schkade (2005), both Andrews and Withey (1976) and Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers 
(1976) did in fact measure a substantial number of other variables that appear to fall into the category of 
“life circumstances.” Prima facie examples of variables that are candidates for this status include 
questions such as whether the participant is currently in employment, how many years of education he or 
she completed, and whether he or she has any health problems8. Indeed, these variables appear to meet 
Lyubomirsky et al.’s own definition of life circumstances: 
This category consists of happiness-relevant circumstantial factors, that is, the incidental 
but relatively stable facts of an individual’s life. Happiness-relevant circumstances may include 
the national, geographical, and cultural region in which a person resides, as well as demographic 
factors such as age, gender, and ethnicity . . . Circumstantial factors also include the individual’s 
personal history, that is, life events that can affect his or her happiness, such as having 
experienced a childhood trauma, being involved in an automobile accident, or winning a 
prestigious award. Finally, circumstantial factors include life status variables such as marital 
status, occupational status, job security, income, health, and religious affiliation. (Lyubomirsky et 
al., 2005, p. 117) 
Thus, both Andrews and Withey’s (1976) and Campbell et al.’s (1976) data include a number of 
variables that ought to allow us to estimate the variance in life satisfaction that these authors might have 
reported as being explained by life circumstances (versus “classification variables” or “demographic 
factors”), had this been one of the purposes of their respective studies. Using the original data sets and 
accompanying documentation for the studies reported by Andrews and Withey (1976) and Campbell et al. 
(1976), we retained 15 predictors for Andrews and Withey’s (1976) May 1972 survey, 15 predictors for 
                                               
8
 Of course, as mentioned earlier, a participant’s scores on these items might result from an interaction between life 
circumstances and genetic factors, but for the purpose of our re-analysis we assume that the underlying logic of 





the same authors’ April 1973 survey, and 18 predictors for Campbell et al.’s 1971 survey. Using software 
that was a direct descendant of the mainframe programs used by these authors more than 40 years ago, we 
determined that the percentage of variance explained by either Multiple Classification Analysis, as 
originally used by Andrew and Withey, or ordinary least squares regression, as used by Campbell et al., 
was at least R² = 18.15% (Andrews & Withey / May), 18.13% (Andrews & Withey / April), and 26.47% 
(Campbell et al.). That is, had those researchers set out to study the amount of variance explained by life 
circumstances, they would likely have reported numbers that were on average at least twice as large as 
Lyubomirsky et al.’s (2005) figure of 10%. Full details of our method, as well as links to all of the 
information to reproduce our analyses, are provided in the following sections, together with a more 
conservative re-analysis that uses cross-validation to avoid the dangers of overfitting in models in which 
all the predictors were treated as categorical variables. This re-analysis also shows that, with an 
appropriate choice of predictors, the amount of variance robustly predicted by life circumstances can be 
considerably higher than 10%. 
Method 
In order to estimate the percentage of variance explained by life circumstances (henceforth LC) in 
the original studies on which Lyubomirsky et al.’s (2005) article was ultimately based, we downloaded 
the data sets and accompanying documentation for the study reported by Campbell et al. (1976), and the 
May 1972 and April 1973 studies reported by Andrews and Withey (1976), from the web site of the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), as follows: 
- For Campbell et al.: https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03508.v1 
- For Andrews and Withey: https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03636.v1 
We opened the downloaded data files with SPSS, then exported them into comma-separated value 
(CSV) files for our R code to read. This code then either generated data files for the MicrOSIRIS Multiple 
Classification Analysis (MCA) software, or performed our equivalent regression analyses (both 
“classical” OLS and cross-validated) directly. 
The data sets that we downloaded contained a large number of variables: 176 from Andrews and 
Withey’s (1976) survey conducted in May 1972, 247 from the same authors’ survey conducted in April 
1973, and 567 from Campbell et al.’s (1976) survey conducted in 1971, making a total of 990 survey 
items. However, it was immediately clear that many of these could not possibly be described as 
measuring LC. Therefore, the first author of the present article conducted an initial coding exercise in 





“Administrative” (206 variables across the three surveys): items used by the investigators to 
structure the organization of the studies (e.g., “Week of Interview”). Typically, this information would be 
determined by the interviewer who was conducting the survey in the participant’s home, rather than being 
provided by the participants themselves. 
“Choice” (26 variables): items that appear to reflect a clear volitional choice by the participant, 
such as “Do you belong to a sports team?”. In terms of the “happiness pie” model, such items fall under 
the 40% of variance in well-being that Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) appeared to claim can be enhanced with 
the appropriate choice of activities. 
“Feeling” (323 variables): these are items that reflect participants’ expressed opinion or sentiment 
about some aspect of their lives or their circumstances. Examples are “Are most people trustworthy?,” “In 
what ways is life in the US getting better/worse?,” and “How do you feel about your job?” It might be 
argued that the last of these is to some extent a circumstance; someone who has had a privileged 
upbringing and become, say, a lawyer might look more favorably on their job than someone who was 
brought up in poverty and left school early to perform manual labor. However, the subject matter of this 
item seems to be adequately covered by items such as those asking about pay and promotion chances at 
the respondent’s job, which were put to the panel as candidates to be included as LC. 
 “Outcome” (49 variables): items that measure the participant’s satisfaction (either with their life 
overall, or with a particular domain) or some other aspect of their well-being (e.g., “How happy are you 
these days?”). These are not included because they are the dependent variables that the authors of the 
original surveys were attempting to explain. Notably, each survey contains one measure of overall life 
satisfaction that we used as our dependent variable; this was given the specific coding “Focal” to make it 
easy for our analysis code to pick up. 
“Race–Sex” (6 variables): Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) included “gender” and “ethnicity” in their 
definition of LC. Hence, we included the variables for these two characteristics in each survey in our 
analyses. 
“Recode” (128 variables): items for which the responses were not given directly by the 
participant, but were instead derived by recoding, rescaling, or combining other responses. 
“Uninterpretable” (68 variables): items that did not seem to have any obvious psychological 
interpretation (e.g., “Country where respondent’s father was born”). 
This left 184 variables across the three studies that appeared to be LC candidates. Our aim was, 





representing LC by a majority of neutral observers. Therefore, as our next step, we recruited six 
independent coders to participate in a Delphi-like panel (Adler & Ziglio, 1996; Stitt-Gohdes & Crews, 
2004) in order to classify the remaining 184 variables into LC or “Other.” Among the coders were one 
undergraduate, two doctoral candidates, two postdoctoral researchers, and one assistant professor, all 
working in psychology or related disciplines. Although they were not explicitly told of our hypotheses, 
they were aware that the purpose of the exercise was to examine whether Lyubomirsky et al.’s (2005) 
claims about the percentage of variance explained by LC were supported by the available data. They were 
also given copies of the original code books from the Andrews and Withey (1976) and Campbell et al. 
(1976) studies, which they could consult if they needed clarification of the meaning of any particular 
item. 
Coding by the Delphi panel proceeded in three rounds. In the first round, each coder indicated, for 
each variable, whether they considered it to correspond to LC or “Other.” Coders could also leave 
comments, for example to explain their thought processes in borderline cases. Once all of the results had 
been received, the first author collated them. The 34 variables on which there was unanimous agreement 
were set to one side, and the remainder (150 out of 184) were sent out to the coders for a second round, 
along with the list of votes from the first round and any comments that had been made. The coders 
reconsidered and in some cases changed their coding of each variable, and returned their results, which 
were again collated, resulting in the reduction of the number of variables without unanimous agreement 
from 150 to 73. (Two coders dropped out of the process after the first round, so the scores in the second 
and third rounds were based on the results of four people, rather than six.) The process was then repeated 
for a third round of coding, at the end of which 53 variables remained without unanimous agreement on 
their coding. In these cases, those with only one dissenting vote (N = 49) were treated as if the result had 
been unanimous, while in the remaining four cases, the tie was broken by the first author, who decided 
that three variables corresponded to LC and one did not. At all times during this process, all of the coders 
(who included the second author of the present article) were unaware of the others’ identities, except that 
each coder was identified by the same unique letter throughout the process. The second author of the 
present article became a co-author late in the coding process; however, she received no more information 
about the ongoing process of data collection than any other panel member. 
At the end of three rounds of coding by the panel, only eight of the 184 variables that had been 
identified by the first author before the process had been eliminated. It was clear that we needed to reduce 
this number further, partly to avoid overfitting with classical models (MCA and linear regression) due to 
an excessive number of predictors, partly to avoid attrition of the effective sample size due to missing 





single predictor), and partly because we wanted to establish reasonable minimum values for the amount of 
variance explained by the models that the original authors could have chosen to run, had they set out 
specifically to investigate the effects of life circumstances (LC) on well-being. We therefore applied a 
further selection to reduce the number of variables, most notably from Campbell et al.’s (1976) data set, 
in order to reduce model complexity and to ensure some comparability between the three different 
samples. This reduced the number of LC variables to 15 (out of 32 that had been identified at the end of 
the Delphi panel exercise as measuring LC) for Andrews and Withey’s (1976) May survey, 15 (out of 35) 
for the same authors’ April survey, and 18 predictors (out of 119) for Campbell et al.’s (1976) survey. 
Within the retained variables, we also pooled response categories that were very uncommon or appeared 
to be excessively numerous (for example, we bracketed length of marriage into five-year groups, to avoid 
having 40 or more categories). 
We believe that our process for selecting and recoding LC variables was appropriately 
conservative. Those decisions taken unilaterally by the authors were always in the direction of reducing 
the number of predictors; the decisions to include (rather than exclude) variables from the original 
surveys were taken by majority or unanimous votes by the Delphi panel. None of the three variables for 
which the first author’s casting vote resulted in them having LC status at the end of the Delphi process 
survived our subsequent simplification. In particular, we accepted that our approach might, on occasion, 
omit a predictor of well-being that could have been included, under the heading of LC, by another team of 
researchers. Any such omission would, of course, be likely to result in us underestimating the amount of 
variance explained. 
Having identified a subset of variables that we believed unambiguously corresponded to LC, we 
then computed the variance explained by those variables in the principal outcome variable for life 
satisfaction in each study. First, we applied Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA; Lolle, 2008) with the 
MicrOsiris software package (Van Eck and Van Eck, 2015). MCA was the technique used exclusively by 
Andrews and Withey (1976) for their analyses; indeed, MicrOsiris is a direct descendant of the OSIRIS 
mainframe software used by these authors more than 40 years ago. Second, we applied multiple 
regression analyses that mirror those used by Campbell et al. (1976). These two analytic approaches 
(which are almost equivalent, because MCA is essentially a technique for automatically performing the 
necessary dummy coding to allow categorical predictors in multiple regression) allowed us to answer the 
question “If these authors had tried to estimate the percentage of variance explained by LC, what numbers 
would they have found?” Third, since the use of MCA or multiple regression with dummy coded 
predictors (as performed in the original studies) will likely result in inflated estimates because these 





for an introduction to the issue of overfitting), we applied the technique of cross-validation to our 
regression models to arrive at more realistic/reliable estimates of the percentage of variance that can be 
explained by LC. 
All of the information (R code and other documentation) needed to reproduce our analyses is 
available at https://osf.io/423sr. 
Results 
The lists of items measuring LC that were retained at the end of the classification exercise are 
shown in Table S1. The MicrOsiris software indicated that the percentage of variance explained by the 
retained variables using MCA was R² = 18.15% (Andrews & Withey / May), 18.13% (Andrews & 
Withey / April), and 26.47% (Campbell et al.). Running multiple regression analyses in R, in which all 
predictors were treated as categorical variables, resulted in virtually the same estimates, highlighting the 
conceptual similarity between the MCA approach and the more common multiple regression framework. 
The percentage of variance explained according to these models were R² = 18.19% (Andrews & Withey / 
May), 18.32% (Andrews & Withey / April), and 26.47% (Campbell et al.). However, because treating all 
predictors as categorical variables results in extremely flexible models, these numbers might reflect 
overestimations: Hence, we further reduced the flexibility of the regression models by pooling rare 
categories and treating predictors such as years of education as continuous variables. We then applied 
repeated K-fold cross-validation (10 repetitions, 10 folds) to estimate how well the regression models 
performed on data that had not been used to estimate the model (i.e., out-of-sample performance). Using 
this more conservative approach, the predicted variance in life satisfaction was R² = 1.92% (Andrews & 
Withey / May), 6.39% (Andrews & Withey / April), and 17.90% (Campbell et al.). It should be noted 
that, while the Ns (1,297, 1,433, and 2,147) of the samples that we re-analyzed exceed the sample sizes of 
many psychological studies, they are comparably small for the research question at hand, which involves 
a multitude of potentially intercorrelated predictors, as well as an outcome variable that might be 
substantially affected by measurement error because of the brief nature of the measurement. This issue 
could account for the large drop in variance explained when moving from in-sample performance to out-
of-sample performance, and highlights the need for large-scale investigations to arrive at reliable and 
credible estimates. 
Discussion 
Perhaps somewhat ironically, our most conservative estimates of the variance in well-being 
explained by LC are even below 10% in two of the three samples. However, the variables included by 





conservative than the current domain standard in psychology (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017). This can 
probably be attributed to the fact that Campbell et al.’s study included a broader range of LC, including, 
for example, social factors such as the reported number of close friends. Once those variables that were 
essentially identical across the three studies are taken into account, our selection of predictors for the 
Campbell et al. study includes just six—out of around 100—variables that were unique to that study (i.e., 
not included by Andrews & Withey, 1976, in either of their studies), suggesting that a few well-chosen 
variables tapping LC can robustly predict a considerable amount of variance. 
 Change in the number of within-subject articles in Journal of Happiness Studies 
On December 19, 2018, we visited the web site of the Journal of Happiness Studies and used a 
null search (https://link.springer.com/search/?facet-journal-id=10902) to retrieve all of the articles from 
the journal, sorted “Newest First.” The first article retrieved was Ingenfeld, Wolbring, and Bless (2018). 
We selected articles in chronological order down the list until we had obtained 50 abstracts from which 
we could determine whether the article described an empirical study, and if so, whether within-subject 
methods were used within that article. After checking 52 abstracts, the last of which was Tavor, Gonen, 
Weber, and Spiegel (2018) on page 3 of the results, we had obtained 50 empirical articles, of which 16 
described within-subject methods. We next sorted the articles “Oldest First” and chose a page that 
contained articles from 2007–2008 (https://link.springer.com/search/page/12?facet-journal-
id=10902&sortOrder=oldestFirst), the first of which was Waterman, Schwartz, and Conti (2008). Again, 
we moved down the list checking the abstracts (81 in total) until we had obtained 50 empirical articles, 
the last of which was Collins, Sarkisian, and Winner (2009) on page 16. Of those 50 articles, seven 
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Table S1. Survey Questions Included in Our Multiple Classification Analysis and Regression Models. 
Andrews & Withey (1976), May survey Andrews & Withey (1976), April survey Campbell et al. (1976) 
Q# Text Q# Text Q# Text 
11 Age of respondent 191 Respondent's age bracket 381 Respondent's age at time of 
interview 
147 Sex of Respondent 192 Respondent's sex 46 Respondent's sex 
148 Race of Respondent 185 Respondent's ethnic group 423 Respondent's race 
142 Education of Respondent 136 Highest year of school/college 
completed by respondent 
149 What is the highest level of 
education attained by respondent? 
138 Total Family Income Bracket 170 Total family income 270 Respondent's total family 
income last year 
16 Number of children under 18 in 
respondent's family unit 
131 Number of people less than 18 
years old in household 







41 Are you working now, 
unemployed or laid off, retired and not 
working, or what? 
141 Respondent's present 
employment status 
163 Respondent's current 
employment status 
42 What is your main occupation? 159 Respondent's main occupation 516 Respondent's census occupation 
classification 
44 Do you work for someone else, 
or yourself, or what? 
144 Is respondent employed by 
someone else, or self-employed? 
166 Is respondent self-employed or 
does s/he work for someone else? 
139 Are you married, widowed, 
divorced, separated, or have you never 
been married? 
178 Respondent's marital status 288 Respondent's marital status 
140 How long have you been 
married? 
  289 How long has respondent been 
married? 
17 Age of youngest child under 18 
in respondent's family unit 








18 Age of oldest child under 18 in 
respondent's family unit 
    
46 Are you the head of the family 
unit? 
160 Is respondent head of family?   
  171 Does family own 
house/apartment, or rent it? 
108 Does respondent own or rent the 
dwelling unit? 
34 Would you say that you are 
better off or worse off financially than 
you were a year ago? 
    
  180 Do you have a telephone here at 
home? 
  
  44 Do you (or anyone else here in 







    104 How adequate is dwelling unit 
for respondent and family? 
    265 Respondent's religious 
instruction when growing up 
    266 Does respondent have problems 
with health? 
    277 How many good friends does 
respondent have? 
    426 Respondent's apparent 
intelligence 
    387 Did respondent live with father 
& mother until age 16? 
Notes: Q#: Question number from the original survey. Questions on the same line are considered to be equivalent 
